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AFTER GONZALES V. RAICH:
IS THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
CONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE?
BRADFORD C. MANK*

In both its 1995 decision United States v. Lopez and in its
2000 decision United States v. Morrison, the Supreme Court
had adopted a narrow economic interpretation of congressional authority to regulate intrastate activities under the
Commerce Clause. In four separate cases, three circuit courts
(the District of Columbia, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits) struggled with deciding whether Congress may still protect endangered and threatened species that have little commercial
value under the Commerce Clause after Lopez and Morrison.
In each case, the court concluded that Congress did have the
authority to protect endangered species under the Commerce
Clause, including small isolated intrastate species, although
there were dissenting opinions in each case. Because Lopez
and Morrison failed to provide an adequate framework for
analyzing Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause,
the four decisions applied different and sometimes clearly
contradictory rationales to justify regulation of endangered
species under the Commerce Clause.
In 2005, however, the Court in Gonzales v. Raich limited
the scope of Lopez and Morrison by allowing Congress
greater latitude to regulate intrastate activities under the
Commerce Clause if they are regulated as part of a comprehensive statutory scheme that on the whole appropriately
regulates interstate commerce. By emphasizing the authority of Congress to regulate non-economic, intrastate activities
as part of a comprehensive scheme of regulation, both the
Raich majority opinion and Justice Scalia's concurring opinion-with its emphasis on the Necessary and Proper
Clause-support the view that Congress has authority under
the Commerce Clause to regulate all endangered species, in-

* James Helmer, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of
Law. I thank Louis Bilionis and Michael Blumm for their comments. I thank the
Harold C. Schott Fund for financial support. All errors or omissions are my responsibility.
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eluding intrastate species or those with no direct commercial
value in interstate commerce, because the ESA's comprehensive scheme is necessary to preserve interdependent species
and ecosystems that do have significant impacts on interstate commerce. Furthermore, because the statute regulates
only endangered and threatened species, leaves all other species to state regulation, and promotes concurrent federalstate regulation of wildlife, the ESA's regulation of endangered species is cabined by the type of limiting principles
that Justice Scalia applied in his Raich concurrence, and,
therefore, the ESA is consistent with the Constitution's federalist values.

I.

INTRODUCTION

In its 1995 decision United States v. Lopez! and again in its
2000 decision United States v. Morrison,2 the Supreme Court
adopted a narrow, economic interpretation of congressional authority to regulate intrastate activities under the Commerce
Clause. 3 In response, a series of commentators wrote articles
addressing whether the two decisions' narrow, economic interpretation of the Commerce Clause raised doubts about Congress's authority under the Endangered Species Act (ESA)4 to
regulate either purely intrastate species or those with insignificant commercial value. 5 Concerns about the constitutionality
1. 514 U.s. 549 (1995).
2. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
3. The Commerce Clause provides that "Congress shall have Power ... [tlo
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see infra notes 84-90, 111-12 and
accompanying text.
4. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (2004).
5. See, e.g., Christy H. Dral & Jerry J. Phillips, Commerce by Another Name:
Lopez, Morrison, SWANCC, and Gibbs, Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,413
(Apr. 2001) (stating that Lopez raises serious questions about whether Congress
has the authority to regulate endangered species that lack significant commercial
value); Bradford C. Mank, Protecting Intrastate Threatened Species: Does the Endangered Species Act Encroach on Traditional State Authority and Exceed the
Outer Limits of the Commerce Clause?, 36 GA. L. REV. 723, 735-36 (2002) (arguing
that Lopez and Morrison raise serious constitutional concerns about Congress's
authority to regulate endangered species with little economic value, especially
species limited to one state); John Copeland Nagle, The Commerce Clause Meets
the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly, 97 MICH. L. REV. 174 (1998) (same); Eric
Brignac, The Commerce Clause Justification of Federal Endangered Species Protection: Gibbs v. Babbitt, 79 N.C. L. REV. 873, 874, 883 (2001) (same); Omar N.
White, The Endangered Species Act's Precarious Perch: A Constitutional Analysis
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of the ESA were heightened after the Court's 2001 decision in
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U. S. Army
Corps of Engineers (8WANCC),6 a case in which the Army
Corps of Engineers (Corps) had claimed jurisdiction under the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) to regulate isolated, intrastate seasonal ponds that provided habitats for migratory birds.? The Court avoided the constitutional issue by
narrowly interpreting the statute to exclude isolated waters
and concluding that Congress intended the statute to apply
only to navigable waters.8 In dicta, however, the Court suggested that if Congress had sought to regulate non-navigable,
intrastate waters in the statute, then such regulation might
exceed its authority under the Commerce Clause because such
intrastate land use regulation is a traditional area of local government contro1. 9 In conjunction with Lopez and Morrison, the
Court in SWANCC suggested an interpretation of the Commerce Clause that might threaten the constitutionality of the
ESA, which protects species that live in only one state as well
as those with little commercial value.l°
In four separate cases, three federal courts of appeals have
struggled with deciding whether Congress may still protect enUnder the Commerce Clause and the Treaty Power, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 215, 235
(2000) (same).
6. 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
7. See id. at 162--B4; 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000); Bradford C. Mank, The Murky
Future of the Clean Water Act After SWANCC, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 811 (2003) (discussing SWANCC's implication that Congress may not regulate isolated wetlands
under the Commerce Clause).
8. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167-74; Mank, supra note 7.
9. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174 (citing Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp.,
513 U.S. 30, 44 (1994) ("[R]egulation of land use [is] a function traditionally performed by local governments."»; Bradford C. Mank, Can Congress Regulate Intrastate Endangered Species Under the Commerce Clause? The Split in the Circuits
over Whether the Regulated Activity is Private Commercial Development or the
Taking of Protected Species, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 923, 929, 959 (2004). In its 2006
decision Rapanos v. United States, the Supreme Court again focused on the statutory meaning of the Clean Water Act and did not reach the scope of Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate non-navigable waters. 126 S. Ct.
2208 (2006). In dicta, Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion cited Raich for the
principle that Congress may regulate some intrastate activities as part of a comprehensive statutory scheme. Id. at 2250 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
10. See Michael C. Blumm & George A. Kimbrell, Flies, Spiders, Toads,
Wolves, and the Constitutionality of the Endangered Species Act's Take Provision,
34 ENVTL. L. 309, 327 (2004) ("Many, perhaps most, listed species have no commercial, recreational, or medicinal value and exist only in one state."); Mank, supra note 5, at 769-73 (same); infra notes 145, 255-59, 262 and accompanying text.
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dangered and threatened speCIes under the Commerce
Clause. I I In each case, the court concluded that Congress had
the authority to protect endangered species under the Commerce Clause, including small isolated intrastate species that
have little commercial value, although there were dissenting
opinions in each case. Due to Lopez's and Morrison's failure to
provide an adequate framework for analyzing Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause, the four decisions applied
different and, sometimes, clearly contradictory rationales to
justify regulation of endangered species. 12 Two of the circuit
courts aggregated all endangered and threatened species in determining that such species have a substantial impact on interstate commerce and in concluding that the ESA is constitutional, but the Supreme Court has never validated that
approach. 13
In 2005, the Supreme Court limited the scope of Lopez and
Morrison in Gonzales v. Raich l4 by allowing Congress greater
latitude to regulate intrastate activities if those activities are
regulated as part of a comprehensive statutory scheme that on
the whole appropriately regulates interstate commerce; the Lo-

II. See GDF Realty Inv. v. Norton (GDF) , 326 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 2003), reh'g
denied, 362 F.3d 286 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1114 (2005);
Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 2003), reh'g denied, 334
F.3d 1158 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (en banc); Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir.
2000); Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt (NAHB), 130 F.3d 1041, 1052 (D.C.
Cir. 1997); Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 10, at 326-45 (discussing four cases
addressing constitutionality of Endangered Species Act); Mank, supra note 9, passim (same).
12. See supra note 11 and accompanying text; infra notes 13, 145, 258-59,
340-46,381-85 and accompanying text.
13. See GDF, 326 F.3d at 638-41 (stating that it did not directly aggregate
the taking of the Cave Species with takings of other endangered species to find a
substantial effect on interstate commerce, but concluding that, because the taking
of all Cave Species is part of a larger economic regulation scheme of the ESA, the
takings could be aggregated with other takings of endangered and threatened
species to find a substantial impact on interstate commerce); NAHB, 130 F.3d at
1046 ("[Courts] may look not only to the effect of the extinction of the individual
endangered species at issue in this case, but also to the aggregate effect of the extinction of all similarly situated endangered species.").
14. 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005); Jonathan H. Adler, Is Morrison Dead? Assessing a
Supreme Drug (Law) Overdose, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 751 (2005); Michael
Blumm & George A. Kimbrell, Gonzalez v. Raich, the "Comprehensive Scheme"
Principle, and the Constitutionality of the Endangered Species Act, 35 ENVTL. L.
491, 494-98 (2005) (discussing Raich's use of the comprehensive scheme principle
and arguing Raich increases the probability that the Supreme Court will find the
Endangered Species Act constitutional).
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pez and Morrison decisions had not addressed this issue. ls In
Raich, the Court held that the federal Controlled Substances
Act (CSA)16 did not exceed Congress's authority under the
Commerce Clause because the power to prohibit the intrastate
cultivation and .use of marijuana in compliance with California
law was rationally related to the regulation of interstate commerce in marijuana. Justice Stevens's majority opinion stated
that even the Lopez decision had recognized the ability of Congress to regulate non-economic, intrastate activities if their
regulation was necessary to effectuate regulation of interstate
commerce. 17 Because of the likelihood that some medical marijuana would be diverted to interstate recreational drug use, the
Court concluded that the CSA could prohibit intrastate, noncommercial cultivation and possession of cannabis for personal
medical purposes. 18
Not joining the majority opinion in Raich, Justice Scalia
wrote an interesting and potentially influential concurring
opinion that relied on the Constitution's Necessary and Proper
Clause to justify regulation of medical marijuana under the
Commerce Clause. 19 His emphasis on the role of the Necessary
and Proper Clause could be especially helpful in defending
Congress's authority to enact comprehensive statutes to regulate intrastate environmental harms that do not directly affect
interstate commerce, but indirectly affect the environment in

15. See infra notes 158, 167 and accompanying text.
16. See Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§
801-971 (2000». The CSA makes it unlawful to manufacture, distribute, dispense,
or possess any controlled substance except as authorized by the Act. 21 U.S.C. §
841(a)(1), 844(a); Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2203.
17. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2210. Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion in
Raich, joined by Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer had dissented in both Lopez and Morrison.
Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion in Lopez. See infra notes 101-05,
178--79 and accompanying text.
18. See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2211-12; infra notes 173-76 and accompanying
text.
19. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2215--20 (Scalia, J., concurring); Adler, supra note 14,
at 766-68 (discussing and criticizing Justice Scalia's concurrence in Raich); Randy
E. Barnett, Scalia's Infidelity: A Critique of "Faint-Hearted" Originalism, 75 U.
CIN. L. REV. 7 (2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.comlso13/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=880112 (same) (This paper was presented as the 2006 William Howard Taft
Lecture at the University of Cincinnati School of Law); Eric R. Claeys, Raich and
Judicial Conservatism at the Close of the Rehnquist Court, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 791, 814-15 (2005) (same).
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ways that in the aggregate substantially affect interstate commerce. 20
Both the Raich majority and Justice Scalia's concurring
opinion, with its emphasis on the Necessary and Proper
Clause, offer a way around many of the difficulties resulting
from the failure of Lopez and Morrison to define the line between economic and non-economic activities under the Commerce Clause. 21 By emphasizing the authority of Congress to
regulate non-economic, intrastate activities as part of a comprehensive scheme of regulation, Raich's reasoning implies
that Congress has authority under the Commerce Clause to
regulate endangered species. 22 In conjunction with the Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress may protect all endangered
species, including intrastate species or those with no direct
commercial value in interstate commerce, because the ESA's
comprehensive scheme is necessary to preserve interdependent
species and ecosystems that do have significant impacts on interstate commerce. Furthermore, because the statute regulates only endangered and threatened species, leaves all other
species to state regulation, and promotes concurrent federalstate regulation of wildlife, the ESA's regulation of interstate

20. See infra notes 311-12, 395-96, 411, 427 and accompanying text.
21. See Robert A. Schapiro & William W. Buzbee, Unidimensional Federal·
ism: Power and Perspective in Commerce Clause Adjudication, 88 CORNELL L.
REV. 1199, 1202, 1204-05, 1228, 1258-{)0 (2003) (arguing Lopez and Morrison fail
to clarify which types of commercial activities are within the scope of the Commerce Clause and give courts too much discretion to decide the scope of the commerce power); Gil Seinfeld, The Possibility of Pretext Analysis in Commerce Clause
Adjudication, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1251, 1276-87 (2003) (discussing difficulties lower courts have encountered in distinguishing economic from non-economic
activities); infra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
22. See Adler, supra note 14, at 775-76 (suggesting that, after Raich, the Supreme Court is likely to uphold the constitutionality of the ESA as a comprehensive scheme); Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 14, at 494-98. But see Supplemental Brief in Support of Certiorari 1-9, GDF Realty Investments v. Norton, 545
U.S. 1114 (2005) (No. 03-1619), available at http://www.mayerbrownrowe.com/
propertyrights/cases/GDF_Supp_Br.pdf (arguing Cave Species and endangered
species in general are not fungible commodities, distinguishing Raich from facts
in GDF and contending that the ESA is unconstitutional and Supreme Court
should grant certiorari); Randy E. Barnett, Foreword, Limiting Raich, 9 LEWIS &
CLARKL. REV. 743,747 (2005) (Professor Barnett argued the Raich case on behalf
of the respondents) (''Raich could be construed simply as having adopted a limited
'fungible goods' rationale for why it is essential to the larger prohibition of a national market in a commodity that even the local cultivation and possession of
such a commodity also be reached."); infra notes 255, 311-'-12, 374-75, 395-96,
411-13, 417, 419-20 and accompanying text.
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commerce is cabined by the type of limiting principles that Justice Scalia applied in his Raich concurrence and is therefore
consistent with federalism. 23

II. HISTORY OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
To understand Raich, it is essential to discuss the history
of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Commerce Clause.
Between 1937 and 1995, the Court developed a broad approach
to interpreting the Clause that allowed Congress to regulate
some intrastate activities if they were an essential part of a
comprehensive national regulatory scheme. Beginning in 1995,
the Court began to adopt a more restrictive interpretation of
the Clause, but as Raich explained, the Court did not foreclose
the use of the comprehensive statutory scheme rationale for
federal regulation of some wholly intrastate, noncommercial
activities. The comprehensive scheme rationale for the regulation of certain wholly intrastate, noncommercial activities is
the key to justifying the ESA's regulation of all threatened and
endangered species no matter how isolated or economically insignificant.

A. Commerce Clause Cases Before 1937
Before 1937, the Supreme Court often read the scope of the
Commerce Clause narrowly to prohibit federal regulation of intrastate activities, but it also sometimes read the Clause more
broadly to allow regulation of intrastate activities if such regulation was necessary to effectuate certain congressional purposes. The Commerce Clause provides that "Congress shall
have Power ... [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."24
Commentators have disagreed about whether the original intent of the Commerce Clause was limited to only congressional
regulation of interstate trade and transportation of goods or
whether it contemplated broader regulation. 25

23.

See infra notes 261-95 and accompanying text.

24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
25. Compare Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce
Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101, 104 (2001) (arguing original intent of Commerce
Clause was to regulate only interstate trade and transportation of goods), with
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr. & Grant S. Nelson, Essay, A Critique of the Narrow Inter-
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In Gibbons v. Ogden,26 the Supreme Court offered mixed
messages about the extent of Congress's authority under the
Commerce Clause to regulate intrastate activities affecting interstate commerce.27 Chief Justice Marshall stated that Congress's commerce power "is complete in itself, may be exercised
to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other
than are prescribed in the constitution."28 The Court refused to
limit the term "commerce" to "prescribing rules for the conduct
of individuals, in the actual employment of buying and selling,
or of barter."29 However, the Court placed some limits on the
scope of Congress's authority under the Clause by stating that
it does not reach intrastate activities "which are completely
within a particular State, which do not affect other States, and
with which it is not necessary to interfere, for the purpose of
executing some of the general powers of the government."30
From the late nineteenth century until 1936, the Supreme
Court emphasized the limiting language in Gibbons and usually interpreted the Commerce Clause narrowly to exclude in-

pretation of the Commerce Clause, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 695, 707-15 (2002) (arguing
original understanding of text of Commerce Clause allows broad regulation of ac·
tivities connected to interstate commerce).
26. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
27. Id. at 186-98; Mank, supra note 5, at 735; Sophie Akins, Note, Congress'
Property Clause Power to Prohibit Taking Endangered Species, 28 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 167, 169-71 (2000) (arguing that Justice Marshall's Gibbons opinion
implied that commerce power reaches intrastate activities affecting interstate
commerce); see also Louis J. Virelli III & David S. Leibowitz, "Federalism Whether
They Want It or Not':· The New Commerce Clause Doctrine and the Future of Federal Civil Rights Legislation After United States v. Morrison, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
926, 927-29 (2001) (arguing Justice Marshall's opinion in Gibbons adopted broad
interpretation of commerce power).
28. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 196.
29. Id. at 190; Seinfeld, supra note 21, at 1256-57. There is continuing judicial and scholarly debate about whether Gibbons's broad interpretation of the
word "commerce" reflects the original intent of the Constitution's framers. See
Seinfeld, supra note 21, at 1256-57 n.18. Compare Barnett, supra note 25, at 104
(arguing original intent of Commerce Clause was to regulate only interstate trade
and transportation of goods), with Pushaw & Nelson, supra note 25, at 707-15
(arguing original understanding of text of Commerce Clause allows broad regulation of activities connected to interstate commerce). Justice Thomas's concurring
opinion in Lopez argues that "at the time the original Constitution was ratified,
'commerce' consisted of selling, buying, and bartering, as well as transporting for
these purposes," and did not include anything more. United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 585 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
30. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 195; Mank, supra note 5, at 736; Akins, supra note 27,
at 170 ("The Court ... acknowledged that the states have the sole ability to regulate completely intrastate commerce.").
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trastate product, mining, or manufacturing activities-even if a
product later entered interstate commerce--on the grounds
that the intrastate manufacturing only indirectly affected interstate commerce. 31 In some "public morals" cases, however,
the Court did read the Clause expansively to allow, for instance, congressional legislation regulating interstate movement of state lottery tickets. 32 Additionally, during the early
twentieth century, the Court interpreted the Clause to authorize Congress to regulate a few intrastate activities if they were
inextricably connected with interstate activities and had a direct effect on interstate commerce. 33 In 1935, the Court
warned that it must limit Congress's authority to regulate intrastate activities under the Clause because otherwise "there
[would] be virtually no limit to the federal power and for all
practical purposes we [would] have a completely centralized
government."34

31. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 304 (1936) (''Mining brings
the subject matter of commerce into existence. Commerce disposes of it."); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 271-72 (1918) (holding Commerce Clause did not
authorize child labor laws because intrastate manufacturing is not interstate
commerce even though products later entered interstate commerce), overruled by
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116 (1941); United States v. E.C. Knight
Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1895) (holding sugar manufacturers were outside Sherman
Act because sugar manufacturing was intrastate activity even if sugar later entered interstate commerce, stating "Commerce succeeds to manufacture, and is
not part of it."); Mank, supra note 5, at 736; Seinfeld, supra note 21, at 1259-60;
David W. Scopp, Commerce Clause Challenges to the Endangered Species Act: The
Rehnquist Court's Web of Confusion Traps More Than the Fly, 39 U.S.F. L. REV.
789, 796-97 (2005) (discussing E.G. Knight's direct versus indirect test for Commerce Clause); John T. Winemiller, The Endangered Species Act and the Imprecise Scope of the Substantial Effects Analysis, 18 TuL. ENVTL. L.J. 159, 171 (2004).
32. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 571 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("In the Lottery Case, the
Court rejected the argument that Congress lacked [the] power to prohibit the interstate movement of lottery tickets because it had power only to regulate, not to
prohibit." (citation omitted».
33. See Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 351 (1914)
(explaining that Congress's authority to regulate extended to intrastate "operations in all matters having such a close and substantial relation to interstate traffic that the control is essential or appropriate to the security of that traffic, to the
efficiency of the interstate service, and to the maintenance of conditions under
which interstate commerce may be conducted upon fair terms and without molestation or hindrance"); Winemiller, supra note 31, at 171.
34. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 548 (1935);
Scopp, supra note 31, at 796-97; Winemiller, supra note 31, at 171.
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B. Commerce Clause Cases from 1937 Until 1995
From 1937 until 1995, the Supreme Court applied a very
lenient rational basis standard for reviewing congressional legislation under the Commerce Clause, and upheld in every case
congressional regulation of intrastate activities even if the activities had only indirect impacts on interstate commerce. 35
Most importantly, the Court developed the comprehensive
scheme rationale to justify regulation of some intrastate activities. This rationale is the primary grounds for concluding that
the ESA's regulation of many intrastate or commercially insignificant species is constitutional under the Commerce Clause.
During the late 1930s and early 1940s, the Supreme Court
recognized that Congress had authority to regulate intrastate
activities if doing so was necessary to enforce a comprehensive
national regulatory scheme. In 1937, in the revolutionary case
of NLRB u. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 36 the Court rejected
its prior doctrine that intrastate manufacturing activities were
beyond the scope of the commerce power, even if a product later
entered interstate commerce. In approving the constitutionality of the 1935 National Labor Relations Act,37 which gave the
National Labor Relations Board broad authority to regulate the
employment relationship between employers and many workers, including manufacturing industries,38 the Court concluded
35. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 604-09 (Souter, J., dissenting) (discussing numer·
ous Court decisions from 1937 until 1995 approving congressional legislation under Commerce Clause); see, e.g., Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276-82 (1981) (upholding Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 regulating intrastate mining activities under Commerce
Clause); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 246, 252-53
(1964) (upholding civil rights legislation prohibiting racial discrimination in public accommodations under Commerce Clause); Louis D. Bilionis, The New Scrutiny, 51 EMORY L.J. 481, 482-84, 503-12 (discussing Supreme Court's highly deferential rational basis review used in wide range of cases from 1937 until 1990s);
Brignac, supra note 5, at 874 ("Mter the Court's decision in NLRB [v. Jones] in
1937, the Commerce Clause was a virtual blank check that Congress could use to
pass almost any legislation."); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Medical Marijuana
Case: A Commerce Clause Counter-Revolution?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 879, 880
(2005) (stating that from 1937 until Lopez in 1995 the Supreme Court did not
strike down a federal statute as unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause);
Seinfeld, supra note 21, at 1263 (same).
36. 310 U.S. 1 (1937).
37. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 151169 (2000»; Seinfeld, supra note 21, at 126l.
38. See Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 22-49; see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at
606 (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating Court's fmding in Jones & McLaughlin Steel
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that intrastate activities that "have such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and
obstructions" are within the scope of the Commerce Clause. 39
Because labor strife in a single factory could affect labor relations in out-of-state factories and, as a result, could substantially affect national productivity in important national industries, the statute was valid. 4o The Court, however, observed
that federalism required some limits on Congress's authority to
regulate intrastate activities. 41
In 1941, the Court in United States v. Darby approved
Congress's regulation of certain intrastate activities closely related to interstate regulation of labor conditions under both the
Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause. 42 The
Court held that Congress could use the commerce power to
prohibit from interstate commerce all goods produced by employers who did not comply with wage and hour standards. 43
Furthermore, under the Necessary and Proper Clause alone,
the Court held that Congress could require employers to keep
employment records in order to demonstrate compliance with
those standards because "the requirement for records even of

has "since been seen as beginning the abandonment, for practical purposes, of the
formalistic distinction between direct and indirect effects"); Dral & Phillips, supra
note 5, at 10,413 (same).
39. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 37; Mank, supra note 5, at 736-37;
Winemiller, supra note 31, at 172. Compare Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at
36-39 (holding statute prohibiting unfair labor practices is within commerce
power), with Carter, 298 U.S. at 310-11 (rejecting similar labor laws in Bituminous Coal Conservation Act as exceeding commerce power).
40. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 37-41; Scopp, supra note 31, at 79798. In Morrison, the Court described the Jones decision as having broadened congressional "latitude in regulating conduct and transactions under the Commerce
Clause." United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608 (2000); Winemiller, supra
note 31, at 172.
41. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 37.
Undoubtedly the scope of this power must be considered in the light of
our dual system of government and may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to
embrace them, in view of our complex society, would effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local and create
a completely centralized government.
Id.; Winemiller, supra note 31, at 172.
42. 312 U.S. 100, 121 (1941).
43. Id. at 113-21.
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the intrastate transaction is an appropriate means to a legitimate end."44
In 1942, in United States v. Wrightwood Dairy,45 the Court
used both the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper
Clause to sustain federal regulation of the intrastate production and sale of milk because such regulation was essential to
the federal regulation of interstate milk prices. 46 First, the
Court explained that Congress's power to regulate interstate
commerce "extends to those intrastate activities which in a
substantial way interfere with or obstruct the exercise of the
granted power."47 The Court stated that the commerce power
reached intrastate activities that substantially affected or obstructed interstate commerce even though the activities were
wholly intrastate: "It is the effect upon interstate commerce or
upon the exercise of the power to regulate it, not the source of
the injury which is the criterion of congressional power."48
Second, under the Necessary and Proper Clause, the Court
stated that Congress had the authority to enact legislation
regulating intrastate activity as "necessary and appropriate to
make the regulation of the interstate commerce effective."49
In the 1942 case Wickard v. Filburn,50 the Court first interpreted the Commerce Clause to authorize Congress to use
an "aggregation" principle to reach far smaller intrastate activities than those in Jones & Laughlin Steel or even Wrightwood Dairy.51 The Court held that Congress could prohibit
farmers from growing wheat exclusively for home consumption
because the aggregate impact of homegrown wheat used by
thousands of farm families had a substantial effect on inter-

44. Id. at 121-24.
45. 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942).
46. Id. at 118--21; Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2217 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (discussing Wrightwood Dairy and the Necessary and Proper Clause);
J. Randy Beck, The New Jurisprudence of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 2002
U. ILL. L. REV. 581, 619 (same); Winemiller, supra note 31, at 172-73 (same).
47. Wrightwood Dairy, 315 U.S. at 119; Winemiller, supra note 31, at 173.
48. Wrightwood Dairy, 315 U.S. at 121; Winemiller, supra note 31, at 173.
49. Wrightwood Dairy, 315 U.S. at 121; see also Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2217
(Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing Wrightwood Dairy); Winemiller, supra note 31,
at 173. As will be discussed in Part IV, infra, Justice Scalia's concurring opinion
in Raich emphasized the above-quoted language in Wrightwood Dairy and similar
cases that used the Necessary and Proper Clause to justify Commerce Clause
regulation.
50. 317 U.S. 111, 118 (1942).
51. See id. at 127-29; Scopp, supra note 31, at 798.
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state commerce that was "far from trivial" by competing with
commercially sold wheat in interstate commerce. 52 Although
acknowledging that one farmer's intrastate activities did not
have a "substantial" impact on interstate commerce, the
Wickard Court concluded that the Commerce Clause authorizes
Congress to regulate such intrastate activities if there was a
rational basis for Congress to believe that those intrastate activities substantially affect interstate commerce when aggregated "together with that of many others similarly situated."53
A significant problem with the Wickard aggregation doctrine is
that it is unclear which intrastate activities courts should aggregate in determining whether the effect upon interstate
commerce justifies legislation under the Commerce Clause. 54
In two 1964 cases, the Court broadly aggregated intrastate
activities to find substantial effects on interstate commerce
that justified newly enacted civil rights legislation prohibiting
racial discrimination in public accommodations, including
those operated by private businesses. In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,55 the Court held that Congress could
prohibit racial discrimination by a motel that obtained seventyfive percent of its guests from outside of Georgia and was next
to two interstate highways. Despite objections that the accommodations themselves did not move across state lines, the
Court reasoned that racial discrimination practiced by the motel and similar motels or hotels in the aggregate harmed interstate commerce by discouraging travel by racial minorities.
The Court refused to examine whether Congress's real motive
was promoting civil rights rather than increasing interstate
commerce and concluded that "Congress was not restricted" by
the fact that it was "dealing with what it considered a moral
problem."56 Heart of Atlanta Motel's recognition that Congress
may regulate for moral reasons should defeat any attempt by

52. 317 U.S. at 124-25 (holding Congress may regulate homegrown wheat
under the Agriculture Adjustment Act of 1938, 7 U.S.C. § 1281 (2000»; Mank, suo
pra note 9, at 945.
53. Mank, supra note 9, at 945. In Lopez, Chief Justice Rehnquist described
Wickard as "perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause author·
ity over intrastate activity." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560; Mank, supra note 9, at 946.
54. See Nagle, supra note 5, at 179-80 ("[W]hat Wickard does not answer is
the level of generality that Congress is permitted to use when aggregating 'simi·
lar' activities.").
55. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
56. Id. at 257; Seinfeld, supra note 21, at 1263-64.
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critics of the ESA to argue that it is invalid under the Commerce Clause because Congress probably had moral as well as
economic motivations when it enacted the statute in 1973.
In Katzenbach v. McClung,57 the Court upheld the application of civil rights legislation to a barbecue restaurant that had
some out-of-state customers and purchased forty-six percent of
its meat from an out-of-state supplier. The Court concluded
that discrimination by the restaurant and similar establishments in the aggregate harmed interstate travel by discouraging travel by racial minorities. 58 It stated that Congress could
consider the "total incidence" of the practice of discriminatory
accommodations on commerce rather than merely the impact of
individual restaurants. 59 The Court stated that it would examine the impact of a "class" of activities rather than the impact
of individual businesses or activity on commerce. 60 Furthermore, the Court stated that it would apply a rational basis test
in determining whether the class of activities had a significant
impact on interstate commerce. 61 The Katzenbach decision
supports the ESA's aggregation of all threatened and endangered species in determining their impact on the national economy and argues against considering the economic impact of
each species separately.
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, in two Commerce
Clause cases, the Court provided further-but incomplete--guidance on when federal legislation may regulate some intrastate activities as part of a comprehensive scheme. First, in
Maryland u. Wirtz,62 the Court held that the Commerce Clause
authorized Congress to extend the Fair Labor Standards Act to
the states because federal regulation of workers in state
schools and hospitals was necessary to effectuate federal regulation of interstate competition among employers.63 The original statute required employers to pay each employee who was
engaged in commerce or the production of goods for commerce a
specified minimum wage, but the challenged amendment extended the law to include all employees working for enterprises

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

379 U.S. 294.
[d. at 300-02.
[d. at 301.
[d. at 303.
[d. at 303-04.
392 U.S. 183 (1968).
[d. at 189-90; Winemiller, supra note 31, at 173.
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engaged in commerce or the production of goods for commerce,
even if an individual employee was not involved in such an activity.64 The Court held that it was rational for Congress to
weigh an employer's impacts on interstate commerce rather
than on individual employee's impact. 65 The Court refused "to
excise, as trivial, individual instances" of the application of labor standards to an employer with a few employees who were
not engaged in activities affecting interstate commerce, reasoning that the aggregate effect of excising all trivial instances
would undermine the effectiveness of the regulatory program. 66
The Court, however, stressed that Congress could regulate intrastate activities with trivial impacts on commerce only if that
regulation was part of a comprehensive regulatory scheme
bearing a substantial relationship to interstate commerce. 67
The Wirtz decision suggests that Congress may regulate some
endangered species that have only trivial impacts on interstate
commerce as long as the ESA is a comprehensive regulatory
scheme bearing a substantial relationship to interstate commerce.
Second, in its next Commerce Clause case, the Supreme
Court provided a little more explanation of when a comprehensive federal statute may reach intrastate activities that would
by themselves not be subject to the Clause. In Perez v. United
States, the Court in 1971 upheld the constitutionality of a federallaw against loan-sharking,68 despite the fact that the federal government was usurping traditional general police powers belonging to state governments. 69
The Perez Court
emphasized that Congress could regulate a class of activities
that significantly affected interstate commerce even though the
regulated class might include some intrastate activities that
64. Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 185-86; Alex Kreit, Why Is Congress Still Regulating
Noncommercial Activity?, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 169, 195 (2004).
65. Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 190-97 (stating that when the Court finds that a "ra·
tional basis for finding a chosen regulatory scheme [is] necessary to the protection
of commerce, our investigation is at an end").
66. Id. at 192-93 (conceding that ''labor conditions in businesses having only
a few employees ... may not affect commerce very much or very often" but stating
that, under Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), courts do not ''have power to
excise, as trivial, individual instances falling within a rationally defined class of
activities"); Winemiller, supra note 31, at 173.
67. Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 192-97.
68. Loan-sharking is the practice of loaning money at exorbitant interest
rates, often with threats of violence or actual violence for failure to repay the loan.
69. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 149-50, 154-57 (1971).
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might not affect interstate commerce.7o The Court observed
that in Darby "a class of activities was held properly regulated
by Congress without proof that the particular intrastate activity against which a sanction was laid had an effect on commerce."7) Quoting Wirtz, the Perez Court stated that "[w]here
the class of activities is regulated and that class is within the
reach of federal power, the courts have no power 'to excise, as
trivial, individual instances' of the class."72 Following Perez,
there is a strong argument that Congress has authority under
the Commerce Clause to categorize all threatened and endangered species as a "class of activities" that significantly affect
interstate commerce.
In the related cases of Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n,73 and Hodel v. Indiana,74 the Supreme
Court more fully developed the comprehensive scheme rationale for justifying the regulation of some intrastate activities.7 5
In Hodel v. Indiana, the Court stated:
A complex regulatory program ... can survive a Commerce
Clause challenge without a showing that every single facet
of the program is independently and directly related to a
valid congressional goal. It is enough that the challenged
provisions are an integral part of the regulatory program
and that the regulatory scheme when considered as a whole
satisfies this test.76

The Court upheld the constitutionality of the "prime farmlands" provisions of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA), even though most of the harm to
such farmlands from mining had intrastate rather than interstate impacts. 77 In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining, the
Court held the Act valid on the ground that the absence of federallegislation would likely lead to ruinous competition among
states in lowering state environmental standards in order to

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
L. Rep.

Id. at 152-55.
Id. at 152.
Id. at 154 (quoting Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 193).
452 U.S. 264 (1981).
452 U.S. 314 (1981).
See Adrian Vermeule, Centralization and the Commerce Clause, 31 Envtl.
(Envtl. L. Inst) 11,334, at 11,335 (Nov. 2001).
76. 452 U.S. at 329 n.17.
77. Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. at 324; Winemiller, supra note 31, at 174.
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retain or attract businesses from other statesJ8 The Court
concluded that the "prime farmland" provisions were reasonably necessary "to ensure that production of coal for interstate
commerce would not be at the expense of agriculture, the environment, or public health and safety, injury to any of which interests would have deleterious effects on interstate commerce."79 It reasoned that Congress may enact legislation
under the Commerce Clause to prevent states from engaging in
a "race-to-the-bottom" to attract businesses because such competition would probably result in inappropriate intrastate environmental standards. 8o The Court stated that it would apply a
deferential rational basis standard of review in determining
"whether a particular exercise of congressional power is valid
under the Commerce Clause" because the "Clause is a grant of
plenary authority to Congress."81
As will be discussed in Part V, the comprehensive scheme
rationale in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and a series of
Supreme Court cases beginning in 1937 is probably the strongest justification for concluding that the regulation of isolated,
economically insignificant endangered species is constitutional
because such regulation is part of the Endangered Species Act's
comprehensive scheme for protecting all endangered species.
Additionally, as will be discussed in Part V, Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining's conclusion that Congress may regulate intrastate activities to prevent a race to the bottom among states
that would eventually harm interstate commerce supports federal protection of endangered or threatened species to prevent
states from under-protecting such species. Under the compre-

78.

Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining, 452 U.S. at 281-82; Mank, supra note 9, at

947.

79. Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. at 327-29; Winemiller, supra note 31, at 174.
80. Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining, 452 U.S. at 281-82; accord Hodel v. Indiana,
452 U.S. at 329; see also Mank, supra note 9, at 947-48 (discussing Hodel v. Vir·
ginia Surface Mining and concept of states racing to bottom by lowering environmental standards to attract business); Neal D. Woods, Interstate Competition and
Environmental Regulation: A Test of the Race-to-the-Bottom Thesis, 87 SOC. SCI.
Q. 174 (2006) (presenting empirical evidence supporting "race-to-the-bottom"
among states regulating surface-mining); Sara D. Van Loh, Note, The Latest and
Greatest Commerce Clause Challenges to the Endangered Species Act: Rancho
Viejo and GDF Realty, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 459, 483 (2004).
81. Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining, 452 U.S. at 276 (citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74
TEX. L. REV. 795, 811 (1996) (discussing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining's use of
Necessary and Proper Clause).
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hensive scheme rationale that allows Congress to regulate
purely intrastate activities if they are an integral part of a larger regulatory scheme and the Court's highly deferential rational basis standard of review in Commerce Clause cases, if
the Supreme Court had addressed the constitutionality of the
ESA sometime between its enactment in 1973 and 1995, the
Court almost certainly would have concluded that Congress
had authority under the Clause to enact the ESA even though
some of the species the statute regulates exist in only one state
or have little direct economic significance. 82
C. A Lopez Revolution? The Supreme Court Narrows the
Commerce Power to Economic Activities
In 1995, the Court in Lopez, with a surprising five-to-four
decision written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that a federal
statute exceeded congressional authority under the Commerce
Clause. 83 The Court held that the Gun-Free School Zones Act
(GFSZA) of 1990, which made it a federal crime to possess a
gun within a school zone (defined as a 1,000-foot radius around
any school), exceeded congressional commerce power because
the activity was primarily non-economic, had little direct relationship to interstate commerce, and regulation of intrastate
crime was largely a state or local function. 84 The Court stated
that the possession of a gun in a school zone "has nothing to do
with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however
broadly one might define those terms."85
The Lopez decision focused on Congress's authority under
the Commerce Clause to regulate "those activities having a
substantial relation to interstate commerce ... i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce."86 Although the Lopez Court used the same rational basis standard
of review as in prior cases, it applied the substantial effects test

82. See also Mank, supra note 5, at 777-80 (arguing that federal regulation of
endangered species is consistent with Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining's rationale that federal government may regulate intrastate activities if there is a serious
failure by state regulators to do so); Mank, supra note 9, at 923-24, 945 (same).
83. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion,
joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. See also Mank, supra
note 9, at 948-53.
84. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 55~7; Mank, supra note 9, at 948.
85. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560-61.
86. Id. at 558-59; Mank, supra note 9, at 948.
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more strictly than had any Court since 1936. 87 The Lopez
Court stated that Congress has authority under the Commerce
Clause to regulate "economic activity" that substantially affects
interstate commerce, but generally does not have power to
regulate noncommercial activities that only indirectly affect interstate commerce. 88
Rejecting prior interpretations of the Commerce Clause,
Chief Justice Rehnquist declared that the Court would restrict
Wickard's aggregation doctrine to economic activities because
the Wickard decision itself had stated that Congress may regulate only activities that "exert[ ] a substantial economic effect
on interstate commerce."89 The Court stated "[w]here economic
activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation
regulating that activity will be sustained."90 The Court did acknowledge that Congress may enact legislation regulating
some intrastate activities that lack a substantial impact on interstate commerce if the regulatory scheme is "an essential
part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the
regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated."91
The Court concluded that the
GFSZA's regulation of gun possession near schools did not meet
the "substantially affects" test for interstate commerce because
it was neither a commercial activity in itself nor an essential
ingredient for a primarily interstate economic activity.92 Thus,
the G FSZA went beyond the boundaries of the Commerce
Clause. 93

87. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 (applying rational basis standard of review);
Mank, supra note 9, at 949.
88. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-63; see also William Funk, The Court, the Clean
Water Act, and the Constitution: SWANCC and Beyond, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl.
L. Inst.) 10,741, at 10,763 (July 2001); Scopp, supra note 31, at 800-02; Mank, supra note 9, at 949.
89. Lopez 514 U.S. at 556 (emphasis added) (quoting Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111, 125 (1942»; see also Mank, supra note 9, at 949; Schapiro & Buzbee, supra note 21, at 1222 (arguing that Lopez interpreted Wickard too narrowly as allowing aggregation of only economic activities).
90. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (emphasis added); Mank, supra note 9, at 949-50.
91. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561; see also Mank, supra note 9, at 950; Vermeule, supra note 75, at 11,335.
92. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (holding that the GFSZA is not "an essential
part of a larger regulation of economic activity"); see also Dral & Phillips, supra
note 5, at 10,414; Mank, supra note 9, at 950.
93. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68; Mank, supra note 9, at 950.
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The Lopez decision suggested that the Co~rt would more
strictly review federal statutes under the Commerce Clause
that infringed on subject areas traditionally regulated by state
or local governments.94 Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged
that some of the Court's decisions, such as Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining, had implied that the Court would grant almost
complete deference to Congress if there was "any rational basis" for a congressional finding that a regulated activity affects
interstate commerce. 95 Chief Justice Rehnquist, who concurred
in the judgment in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining,96 rejected
such broad deference because it would undermine the federalist
"distinction between what is truly national and what is truly
local."97
The Court rejected Congress's "costs of crime" and "national productivity" rationales for the GFSZA because under
these theories it is "difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power, even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or
education where States historically have been sovereign."98
The Court also noted that regulation of school grounds was
within the "general police power" retained by the states and,
thus, not an appropriate area for federal regulation unless
Congress could show a valid economic relationship with interstate commerce. 99 The Court concluded that GFSZA was unconstitutional because otherwise the Court would be "hard
pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is
without power to regulate."100

94. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 n.3; see, e.g., Paul Boudreaux, Federalism and
the Contrivances of Public Law, 77 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 523, 543-47, 552-55, 563,
590 (2003) (discussing and criticizing the Rehnquist Court's use of "tradition" to
restrict congressional authority under the Commerce Clause); Mank, supra note
5, at 770-72; Mank, supra note 9, at 950-51; Winemiller, supra note 31, at 17577.
95. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556-58,567-68; see Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Rec·
lamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981); see also Bilionis, supra note 35, at 509.
96. See 452 U.S. at 311 ("[S]imply because Congress may conclude that a particular activity substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily
make it so.") (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment).
97. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68 (citations omitted); Bilionis, supra note 35, at
509.
98. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564; Mank, supra note 9, at 95l.
99. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567; Mank, supra note 9, at 951; Winemiller, supra
note 31, at 175-78.
100. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564; Bilionis, supra note 35, at 537-39.
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In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O'Connor, agreed with the majority's federalist approach to
interpreting the Commerce Clause when he stated that the
Court should strictly review congressional legislation that
regulates an "area[ ] of traditional state concern" to which
"States lay claim by right of history and expertise."lOl Otherwise, "the boundaries between the spheres of federal and state
authority would blur and political responsibility would become
illusory."102 Nevertheless, he expressed reservations about the
Court using its authority to strike down congressional legislation because courts must consider the differences between "the
economic system the Founders knew" and "the single, national
market still emergent in our own era."103 He also warned that
the Court should not radically change its approach to Commerce Clause jurisprudence, stating that "the Court as an institution and the legal system as a whole have an immense
stake in the stability of our Commerce Clause jurisprudence as
it has evolved to this point."104 Justice Kennedy appeared to
adopt a more flexible approach to the substantial effects test
than the majority opinion when he implied that Congress could
regulate noncommercial activities having a nexus to interstate
commerce if the legislation did not intrude on areas within the
traditional state police power. 105
101. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 576-83 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Adler, supra note 14,
at 756-57; Mank, supra note 5, at 740-41; Mank, supra note 9, at 951-52; White,
supra note 5, at 238-39; Winemiller, supra note 31, at 176.
102. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 576-83 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Adler, supra note 14,
at 757; Mank, supra note 5, at 740-41; Mank, supra note 9, at 951-52; White, supra note 5, at 238-39; Winemiller, supra note 31, at 176.
103. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
104. Id. at 574; Adler, supra note 14, at 756.
105. See also Ann Althouse, Enforcing Federalism After United States v. Lopez,
38 ARIZ. L. REV. 793, 801-04 (1996) (discussing Justice Kennedy's "pragmatic"
concurrence in Lopez as more moderate than Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority
opinion); Bilionis, supra note 35, at 500-02, 549-51 (describing Justices Kennedy
and O'Connor as taking more deferential approach to statutory review than Chief
Justice Rehnquist or Justices Scalia or Thomas, but observing it is uncertain to
what extent they will allow congressional regulation of non-traditional intrastate
activities); Stephen R. McAllister, Essay, Is There a Judicially Enforceable Limit
to Congressional Power Under the Commerce Clause, 44 U. KAN. L. REV. 217, 23842 (1996) (praising Justice Kennedy's "pragmatic" approach to federalism as
model for future cases). See generally Lopez, 514 U.S. at 576-81 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 10, at 352-53; David A. Linehan, Endangered Regulation: Why the Commerce Clause May No Longer Be Suitable
Habitat for Endangered Species and Wetlands Regulation, 2 TEX. REV. L. & POL.
365, 404-05 (1998); Mank, supra note 5, at 740-41; Mank, supra note 9, at 952
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In his dissenting opinion, Justice BreyerlO6 argued that the
majority opinion was inconsistent with the Court's prior decisions upholding statutes regulating activities that had much
less impact on interstate commerce than the possession of a
gun on school grounds. 107 He contended that the majority's
distinction between "commercial" and "noncommercial" transactions was inconsistent with the Commerce Clause, which he
maintained authorizes regulation of either type of activity as
long as it significantly impacts interstate commerce. 108 Additionally, he maintained that the distinction was unworkable
because it was inherently impossible to make such delineations
and would create ''legal uncertainty in an area of law that, until this case, seemed reasonably well settled."109
The Lopez decision did not clearly explain to what extent it
sought to repudiate the Court's highly deferential approach in
Commerce Clause cases between 1937 until 1995. As discussed
in Parts III and IV, both the Raich majority opinion and Justice Scalia's concurring opinion argued that the Lopez decision
acknowledged that Congress could regulate some intrastate,
non-economic activities that are an "an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory
scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were
regulated,"11O although Lopez did not clearly explain when
Congress could do so. The Lopez decision's narrow economic focus raised questions about the constitutionality of the ESA's

n.174; Pushaw, supra note 35, at 908; White, supra note 5, at 238-39. Arguably,
even Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion implied that Congress might use
the commerce power to regulate non·economic activities that do not intrude on
traditional areas of state control. See Mank, supra note 9, at 952 n.174; Virelli &
Leibowitz, supra note 27, at 954; see also Mank, supra note 5, at 741 n.106.
106. He was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg. Lopez, 514 U.S.
at 615 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
107. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 615-16 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing cases); Dral &
Phillips, supra note 5, at 10,414-15; Mank, supra note 9, at 952 n.175 (listing
cases cited in Justice Breyer's Lopez dissent).
108. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 627-28 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Dral & Phillips, supra
note 5, at 10,418-21; Mank, supra note 9, at 952.
109. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 627-28, 630 (Breyer, J., dissenting); accord id. at 608
(Souter, J., dissenting) (criticizing Lopez's commercial versus noncommercial distinction as unworkable); Mank, supra note 9, at 952; Scopp, supra note 31, at
791-92, 802-13, 818-24 (discussing difficulties lower courts have encountered in
applying Lopez's distinction between economic from non-economic activities under
the Commerce Clause); Seinfeld, supra note 21, at 1276-87 (same).
110. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561; Mank, supra note 5, at 768; Mank, supra note 9, at
950; Vermeule, supra note 75, at 11,335.
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protection of species with little economic value, but the decision's acknowledgement of the comprehensive scheme rationale
left open the possibility that the statute is constitutional.

D. The Morrison Court's Respect for Traditional State
Authority and Federalism
In 2000, in Morrison, a five-to-four decision written by
Chief Justice Rehnquist that reflected the same division among
justices as in Lopez, the Court applied Lopez's economic approach to the substantial effects test to invalidate the Violence
Against Women Act (VAWA). The Court held that the VAWA,
which provided a civil damages remedy for victims of genderbased violence, exceeded the limits of the Commerce Clause because the activity was essentially non-economic and was only
indirectly connected to interstate commerce. 111 Explaining Lopez's substantial effects test, the Morrison Court emphasized
that "in those cases where we have sustained federal regulation
of intrastate activity based upon the activity's substantial effects on interstate commerce, the activity in question has been
some sort of economic endeavor."112 Although the Lopez Court
had indicated that Congress's failure to make legislative findings about the connection between guns at schools and interstate commerce was a factor in its decision, the Morrison Court
struck down the VAWA even though Congress had made explicit findings in the statute regarding the economic impacts of
gender-based violence on interstate commerce. The majority
concluded that the causal connection between gender-based
crimes and any economic consequences was too indirect and attenuated to justify regulation under the Clause. 113
Additionally, reflecting Lopez's federalist approach, the
Morrison Court stated that it would examine the constitutionality of legislation under the Clause in light of protecting traditional state functions. 114 The Morrison Court stated that it
111. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611-19 (2000); Mank, supra note
9, at 927-28, 954-55.
112. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611; Mank, supra note 9, at 954.
113. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615-16; Mank, supra note 9, at 928,954.
114. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618 ("[W]e can think of no better example of the po·
lice power, which the Founders denied the National Government and reposed in
the States, than the suppression of violent crime and vindication of its victims.");
Boudreaux, supra note 94, at 543-47, 552-55, 563, 590 (discussing and criticizing
Rehnquist Court's use of "tradition" to restrict congressional authority under the
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would usually reject legislation in which Congress had aggregated primarily non-economic activities to demonstrate a substantial effect on interstate commerce because such a test could
support federal usurpation of traditional state functions. 115 If
the Court accepted a theory of substantial effects based on the
aggregation of primarily non-economic activities, "petitioners'
reasoning would allow Congress to regulate any crime as long
as the nationwide, aggregated impact of that crime has substantial effects on employment, production, transit, or consumption."116
Furthermore, the Morrison Court asserted that federalist
principles supported its decision because such aggregation
could "completely obliterate the Constitution's distinction between national and local authority."117 As an example, the
Court observed that the aggregation of non-economic activities
could "be applied equally as well to family law and other areas
of traditional state regulation since the aggregate effect of marriage, divorce, and childrearing on the national economy is undoubtedly significant." I 18 The Court asserted that its prior decisions had aggregated only economic activities in determining
whether an activity had substantial impacts on interstate
commerce.119 The Morrison decision, however, did not adopt a
clear position that aggregating non-economic activities is always inappropriate, stating: "While we need not adopt a categorical rule against aggregating the effects of non-economic activity in order to decide these cases, thus far ... our cases have
upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only
where that activity is economic in nature."120
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Souter argued that
Wickard and its progeny demonstrated that "Congress has the
power to legislate with regard to activity that, in the aggregate,
has a substantial effect on interstate commerce."12I Despite
the majority's contention that it was applying a rational basis

Commerce Clause); Mank, supra note 5, at 770--72 (same).
115. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615--17; Mank, supra note 9, at 954.
116. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615; Mank, supra note 9, at 954.
117. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615; Mank, supra note 9, at 954.
118. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615--16; Mank, supra note 9, at 954.
119. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610--11; Mank, supra note 9, at 954.
120. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 (emphasis added); Mank, supra note 9, at 95455.
121. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 628, 637-38 (Souter, J., dissenting); Mank, supra
note 9, at 955.
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standard and its "nominal adherence to the substantial effects
test," Justice Souter contended that the majority was in fact
using a more stringent, uncertain standard for determining
whether activities in the aggregate substantially affect interstate commerce because the Court would have upheld the statute if it had heard the case between 1942 and 1995. 122 In light
of congressional legislative findings in the VAWA and its legislative history, he concluded that Congress had supplied rational evidence that gender-motivated violence significantly
impacts interstate commerce and, therefore, the statute was
constitutional. 123
The Morrison decision raised uncertainties about when
Congress may aggregate non-economic, intrastate activities as
part of a national regulatory scheme. Additionally, the Morrison Court arguably departed from the traditional rational basis
standard of review for a more stringent, but uncertain standard. As a result, Morrison raised questions about the constitutionality of the ESA's protection of economically insignificant
species, although it provided no clear answers. Nevertheless,
as is discussed in Parts III and IV, both the Raich majority
opinion and Justice Scalia's concurring opinion observed that
the Morrison decision acknowledged that Congress could regulate some intrastate, non-economic activities as part of a comprehensive national regulatory scheme that is primarily economic in nature. Thus, neither Lopez nor Morrison foreclosed
the possibility that the ESA's protection of species with little
economic value is valid under the comprehensive scheme rationale.

E. Analysis of the Lopez-Morrison Economic Approach to
the Commerce Clause
The Lopez and Morrison decisions made at least three significant changes to the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence. First, both decisions emphasized that the Commerce
Clause primarily concerns economic regulation and suggested
that legislation regulating non-economic activities will receive

122. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 628, 637-38 (Souter, J., dissenting); Mank, supra
note 9, at 955.
123. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 628-38 (Souter, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 9,
at 955.
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less deferential review from the Court.124 Second, both decisions emphasized federalist principles as a basis for determining the appropriate level of scrutiny and implied that federal
legislation intruding on traditional state areas of regulation
will receive much less deference. 125 Third, Morrison explicitly
limited Congress's authority to aggregate non-economic, intrastate actions to demonstrate a substantial effect on interstate
commerce, except perhaps in unusual circumstances, both because the aggregation of non-economic activities could justify
virtually any type of federal regulation and because the aggregation of non-economic activities threatened federal usurpation
of traditional state functions. 126
A fundamental problem with both the Lopez and Morrison
decisions is that they failed to provide a workable test for distinguishing between economic and non-economic activities for
the purpose of determining which intrastate activities may be
aggregated to meet the Commerce Clause's substantial effects
124. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611-17 (emphasizing that Commerce Clause
primarily regulates economic activities); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
559--62 (1995) (same); Funk, supra note 88, at 10,763 (discussing emphasis in Lopez and Morrison on economic basis of Commerce Clause); Mank, supra note 5, at
737-38, 743 (same); Mank, supra note 9, at 957; supra notes 84-90, 111-12 and
accompanying text.
125. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618-19; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564-67; Mank, supra
note 9, at 955, 957; see also Boudreaux, supra note 94, at 543-47, 552-55, 563,
590 (discussing and criticizing Rehnquist Court's use of "tradition" to restrict congressional authority under the Commerce Clause); Mank, supra note 5, at 770--72
(same); supra notes 94, 97-102, 114-15, 117-18 and accompanying text. The
Morrison Court suggested that the scope of the Commerce Clause should be limited to economic activities in part for federalist reasons because states have traditionally regulated many non-economic activities through education, criminal and
family law; however, some commentators have argued that there has been more
concurrent federal regulation of these areas than the Rehnquist Court acknowledged. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615-18 (suggesting federalism requires recognition
of areas of exclusive state control over traditional areas of state and local control
such as criminal and family law); supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text.
But see Gardbaum, supra note 81, at 812 (''The thesis of this Article is that, contrary to the usual view, the constitutional status of the principle of federalism
does not necessarily depend on the existence of areas of exclusive state power.");
Mank, supra note 9, at 954-55, 957 (arguing federal government has often exercised concurrent authority over land use decisions and wildlife); see also
Boudreaux, supra note 94, at 543-47, 552-55, 563, 590 (criticizing Rehnquist
Court's use of "tradition" to restrict congressional authority under the Commerce
Clause because federal government has played a role in many areas that Morrison
and Lopez decisions treated as "traditional" areas of state control); Mank, supra
note 5, at 770--72 (same); infra note 146 and accompanying text.
126. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615-17; Mank, supra note 9, at 954-55; Pushaw,
supra note 35, at 880--81, 894-95; supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text.
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test. 127 The two decisions strongly imply that courts should
aggregate only economic activities, although the decisions leave
open the possibility of rare exceptions where non-economic activities might be aggregated. 128 Yet, the two cases provide no
workable standard for distinguishing between economic and
non-economic activities, or between commercial and noncommercial activities, which are arguably narrower terms than the
economic and non-economic distinction. 129 The Lopez decision
itself acknowledged that "a determination whether an intrastate activity is commercial or noncommercial may in some
cases result in legal uncertainty."130 Any simple categorical
test or exclusion such as a direct/indirect test or an economic/non-economic test that is applied to a complex subject
such as interstate commerce will inevitably fail to answer
many difficult questions. 131 Chief Justice Rehnquist defended
his approach by arguing that such uncertainty was an inherent
problem in defining the boundaries of a limited constitutional
127. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 627-28 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (criticizing Lopez commercial versus noncommercial distinction as unworkable); accord id. at 608
(Souter, J., dissenting); see also Mank, supra note 9, at 928--29, 952 (arguing Lopez and Morrison fail to clarify which types of commercial activities are within
scope of Commerce Clause and give courts too much discretion to decide scope of
commerce power); Schapiro & Buzbee, supra note 21, at 1202, 1204--{)5, 1228,
1258--60 (same); Scopp, supra note 31, at 791-92, 802-13, 818--24 (same); Seinfeld, supra note 21, at 1276-87 (same and discussing difficulties lower courts have
encountered in applying Lopez distinction between economic from non-economic
activities under the Commerce Clause).
128. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611 nA ("[I]n every case where we have sustained federal regulation under the aggregation principle in Wickard u. Filburn
the regulated activity was of an apparent commercial character." (citation omitted»; Mank, supra note 9, at 954-55 (discussing Lopez's and Morrison's reasoning
that Congress may not usually regulate non-economic activities under Commerce
Clause); Scopp, supra note 31, at 802 (same); Seinfeld, supra note 21, at 1276-79
(same); supra notes 90-91, 114-20 and accompanying text.
129. Mank, supra note 9, at 928--29; Pushaw, supra note 35, at 880-81, 894-95
(arguing Lopez and Morrison fail to clarify which types of commercial activities
are within scope of Commerce Clause and give courts too much discretion to decide scope of commerce power); Schapiro & Buzbee, supra note 21, at 1202, 120405, 1228, 1258--60 (same); Scopp, supra note 31, at 802, 811-12 (arguing Lopez
and Morrison decisions failed to define "economic" and "non-economic" terms and
that term "commercial" is narrower than "economic"); Seinfeld, supra note 21, at
1276-87 (discussing difficulties lower courts have encountered in distinguishing
economic from non-economic activities).
130. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566; Scopp, supra note 31, at 820-21; Winemiller, supra note 31, at 178--79.
131. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 640, 644 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[H]istory has
shown that categorical exclusions have proven . . . unworkable in practice.");
Scopp, supra note 31, at 820-21.
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power such as the Commerce Clause.132 Yet, the Court from
1937 until 1995 was able to provide certainty by using a deferential rational basis that gave the political branches the primary responsibility for defining the limits of federal authority.133
A central assumption in Lopez and Morrison is that only
economic activities can substantially affect interstate commerce, but this core assumption is clearly false because noneconomic activities such as violence against women in fact have
substantial impacts on interstate commerce. 134 In an attempt
to side-step this reality, the Lopez and Morrison decisions tried
to suggest that such impacts do not count because they are too
attenuated: non-economic activities such as criminal violence
only indirectly affect commercial activities that constitute interstate commerce. 135 There is no reason to believe, however,
that the impact of non-economic activities on interstate commerce is any more indirect or attenuated than, for example, the
impact of intrastate economic activities such as growing wheat
for home consumption that Wickard recognized as appropriate
for aggregation. 136 The Court's economic versus non-economic
distinction is comparable to, and as flawed as, its pre-1937 dis-

132. See Winemiller, supra note 31, at 178-79; supra note 130 and accompanying text. Compare Lopez, 514 U.S. at 565 with Lopez, 514 U.S. at 627-28, 630
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing majority's distinction between "commercial" and
"noncommercial" activities was unworkable because it was impossible to make
such delineations and would create "legal uncertainty in an area of law that, until
this case, seemed reasonably well settled.").
133. Adler, supra note 14, at 765, 767-68 (arguing that after Raich, "the judicial safeguards of federalism are once again replaced with the political safeguards
of federalism.").
134. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 628 (Souter, J., dissenting); Lopez, 514 U.S. at
627-28 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Dral & Phillips, supra note 5, at 10,418-21; Mank,
supra note 9, at 952, 955; Pushaw, supra note 35, at 881, 895; Scopp, supra note
31, at 802; Winemiller, supra note 31, at 178-79.
135. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615-17; Lopez, 514 U.s. at 567; Scopp, supra note
31, at 802.
136. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 657 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("If chemical emanations through indirect environmental change cause identical, severe commercial
harm outside a State, why should it matter whether local factories or home fireplaces release them?").
We live in a Nation knit together by two centuries of scientific, technological, commercial, and environmental change. Those changes, taken
together, mean that virtually every kind of activity, no matter how local,
genuinely can affect commerce, or its conditions, outside the State - at
least when considered in the aggregate.
Id. at 660 (citation omitted); Pushaw, supra note 35, at 881.
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tinction between direct and indirect affects that excluded the
massive interstate impacts of manufacturing from the scope of
the Commerce Clause. 137
In a Commerce Clause case, a court must determine the
central or "precise" "object" of a regulatory statute-whether
the object is the statute's regulatory "targets" or its beneficiaries-and how close the nexus must be between the object and
the commercial purposes of the Commerce Clause. 138 Lopez
and Morrison failed to provide a framework for courts to use in
deciding: (1) which, of possibly several subjects regulated by a
statute, is the central or precise "object" for determining
whether the statute regulates economic or non-economic activities and (2) whether those activities have substantial impacts
on interstate commerce. As one commentator observed, "a
court cannot resolve whether an object or activity is 'economic'
or 'non-economic' without identifying what that object or activity is."139
For example, in dicta, the SWANCC decision suggested
that the substantial effects test requires the government to
demonstrate that any activity it seeks to regulate under the
Commerce Clause is the precise "object" of the regulatory statute and also that the "object" has substantial effects on inter-

137. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 608 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[I]t seems fair to ask
whether the step taken by the [Lopez] Court ... does anything but portend a return to the untenable jurisprudence from which the Court extricated itself almost
60 years ago."); Boudreaux, supra note 94, at 543-55, 563, 590 (discussing and
criticizing Rehnquist Court's use of "tradition" to restrict congressional authority
under the Commerce Clause and arguing that the Court's approach is similar to
pre-1937 cases using direct-indirect distinction); Mank, supra note 5, at 770-72
(same); Scopp, supra note 31, at 798-99, 802-03 (''The Lopez-Morrison test has
not overcome the previous failures of the 'direct'l'indirect' effects test . . . . Furthermore, the test does not successfully correlate to the statute's impact on interstate commerce; the 'economic'l'non-economic' distinction fails to capture the
ESA's real effects on interstate commerce.").
138. See Mank, supra note 9, at 928-29, 961-63; Schapiro & Buzbee, supra
note 21, at 1202, 1204-05, 1228, 1258-60 (arguing Lopez and Morrison fail to clarify which types of commercial activities are within scope of Commerce Clause and
give courts too much discretion to decide scope of commerce power); Scopp, supra
note 31, at 800; Seinfeld supra note 21, at 1276-87 (discussing difficulties lower
courts have encountered in distinguishing economic from non-economic activities).
139. Scopp, supra note 31, at 801. In a case involving the constitutionality of
the Endangered Species Act under the Commerce Clause, the Fifth Circuit in
GDF Realty Investments, Ltd. v. Norton commented that the Lopez and Morrison
decisions had not "explicitly determined the scope of the substantial effects analysis." 326 F.3d 622, 633 (5th Cir. 2003), reh'g denied, 362 F.3d 286 (5th Cir. 2004)
(en bane), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1114 (2005); Winemiller, supra note 31, at 179.
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state commerce. 140 Because the SWANCC Court's discussion of
what should be the "precise object or activity" in the case is far
from clear,141 commentators have disagreed whether the wetlands or the commercial activities filling in the wetlands are
the "object" that must substantially affect interstate commerce. 142 Because the wetlands are not connected to navigable
waters, and thus have no direct connection to interstate commerce, if they are the "object" of the statute then the Court may
have suggested that the government's efforts to regulate iso140. See Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng'rs (SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159, 173 (2001) (stating that whether presence of migratory birds justified the government's regulation of intrastate, isolated wetlands
"raise[d] significant constitutional questions. For example, we would have to
evaluate the precise object or activity that, in the aggregate, substantially affects
interstate commerce."); Mank, supra note 9, at 96~3; Schapiro & Buzbee, supra
note 21, at 1243 n.252 (arguing that Lopez and Morrison focused on the commer·
cial activities that were the "target" of the challenged statute, but that "[t]he
SWANCC decision, on the other hand, seemed to focus more on the beneficiaries
of regulation - wetlands and migratory birds.").
141. See Scopp, supra note 31, at 801 ("[T]he [SWANCC] Court failed to give
any guidance on how to identify the precise object.").
142. See Michael J. Gerhardt, On Revolution and Wetland Regulations, 90
GEO. L.J. 2143, 2163 (2002) (suggesting that SWANCC focused on the purpose of
the statute and regulations); Christine A. Klein, The Environmental Commerce
Clause, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 38 (2003) (discussing SWANCC).
[T]he SWANCC decision suggested that neither the value of the migra·
tory birds nor the commercial activities that motivated the filling in of
the wetlands could justify congressional regulation because they were
not the precise object of the statute. Instead, the Court implied that the
wetlands themselves are the 'object' that must substantially affect inter·
state commerce.
Mank, supra note 9, at 960-61; Schapiro & Buzbee, supra note 21, at 1243 n.252
(arguing that Lopez and Morrison focused on the commercial activities that were
the "target" of the challenged statute, but that "[t]he SWANCC decision, on the
other hand, seemed to focus more on the beneficiaries of regulation - wetlands
and migratory birds"); Scopp, supra note 31, at 801. Compare Robert H. Bork &
Daniel E. Troy, Locating the Boundaries: The Scope of Congress's Power to Regu·
late Commerce, 25 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 849, 890 (2002) (stating "the object
regulated [in SWANCC] is the intrastate water"), and Mank, supra note 9, at 962
(''While not clearly defming the 'precise object' at issue in the case, the stronger
argument is that the SWANCC court was focusing on the purpose of the statute
and regulations - benefiting wetlands - rather than on the commercial activity
being regulated, the landfill ... [T]he SWANCC Court[ ] focus[ed] on the envi·
ronmental purposes of the statute and regulations rather than the landfill ...."),
with Marianne Moody Jenkins & Nim Razook, United States v. Morrison: Where
the Commerce Clause Meets Civil Rights and Reasonable Minds Part Ways: A
Point and Counterpoint from a Constitutional and Social Perspective, 35 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 23, 54 (2000) (explaining that in the Clean Water Act, "Congress is
not regulating wetlands use; it is regulating the economic, and often commercial
activity of land use and development").
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lated wetlands was beyond Congress's authority under the
Commerce Clause. 143 If the Court meant that the commercial
activities of filling in the wetlands are the "precise object or activity," there is probably a stronger argument that Congress
could regulate isolated wetlands harmed by such activity, but
the Court also suggested that it would not exclusively focus on
the commercial activities causing the destruction of natural resources and would instead look to whether there was some
close relationship between the natural object and the commercial activities. 144 The Court's failure to define what objects or
activities are most important in analyzing whether a statutory
scheme may regulate an activity under the Commerce Clause
has caused especially difficult problems for courts deciding
whether the ESA is constitutional under the Clause. 145

143. See Mank, supra note 7, at 854 (discussing SWANCC's implication that
Congress may not regulate isolated wetlands under the Commerce Clause).
144. See Blumm & Kindrell, supra note 10, at 326.
But it is also possible [Chief Justice Rehnquist] was suggesting that the
commercial nature of the landfill was too attenuated to provide the
commerce necessary to support Clean Water Act jurisdiction. This might
mean that the requisite commercial connection for the ESA take provision is the listed species' substantial effect on commerce, not the regulated activity's commercial nature.
[d.; Gerhardt, supra note 142, at 2163 (suggesting that SWANCC focused on the
purpose of the statute and regulations); Klein, supra note 142, at 38 (discussing
SWANCC); Mank, supra note 9, at 960-62.
[T]he SWANCC decision suggested that neither the value of the migratory birds nor the commercial activities that motivated the filling in of
the wetlands could justify congressional regulation because they were
not the precise object of the statute. Instead, the Court implied that the
wetlands themselves are the 'object' that must substantially affect interstate commerce.
[d.; Schapiro & Buzbee, supra note 21, at 1243 n.252 (''The SWANCC decision, on
the other hand, seemed to focus more on the beneficiaries of regulation - wetlands
and migratory birds"); Scopp, supra note 31, at 801; supra notes 138-43 and accompanying text.
145. See Mank, supra note 9, at 929, 961-62 (discussing the failure of the
SWANCC Court to define the object of a regulatory statute, relating the problem
back to uncertainties in the Lopez-Morrison framework, and discussing difficulties
in defining the regulatory object in endangered species cases when Congress may
aggregate intrastate activities to show substantial effects on interstate commerce
under the Commerce Clause); Scopp, supra note 31, at 792, 801-13, 819-24 (discussing failure of the Lopez and Morrison decisions to define what is the key object or activity of a statute, for determining what is economic or non-economic under Commerce Clause, and the struggles of lower courts to define what is the
object of the Endangered Species Act); Winemiller, supra note 31, at 179-200 (discussing difficulties faced by lower courts in cases involving the Endangered Species Act in applying the substantial effects test and SWANCC's "object" analysis);
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Finally, the Court's federalist attempt to use "tradition" as
a way to limit national power is flawed because in many areas
that Lopez and Morrison define as traditional areas of state
control-including family law, land use law, education law and
criminal law-there is a long history of concurrent national
regulation. 146 The problem with using "tradition" as a test is
that the Court did not explain clearly which areas of activity
are "traditional" areas of state or local regulation immune from
federal regulation. 147 Notably, in National League of Cities v.
Usery, the Court in a 1976 opinion by Justice Rehnquist ruled
that the Commerce Clause does not empower Congress to enforce the minimum-wage and overtime provisions of the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) against the States "in areas of
traditional governmental functions."148 In 1985, however, the
Court in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority
overruled the decision because "[a]lthough National League of
Cities supplied some examples of 'traditional governmental
functions,' it did not offer a general explanation of how a 'traditional' function is to be distinguished from a 'nontraditional'
one. Since then, federal and state courts have struggled with
the task."149
The Lopez and Morrison decisions similarly failed to provide a workable test for distinguishing between traditional and
non-traditional state functions. For example, some decisions

supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text; infra notes 258-59 and accompanying
text.
146. See Boudreaux, supra note 94, at 543--47,552-55,563,590 (criticizing the
Rehnquist Court's use of "tradition" to restrict congressional authority under the
Commerce Clause because the federal government has played a role in many areas that the Morrison and Lopez decisions treated as "traditional" areas of state
control); Mank, supra note 5, at 770-72; supra note 125 and accompanying text;
infra notes 264-74 and accompanying text. But see Winemiller, supra note 31, at
191-92 (suggesting "tradition" is a valid test for limiting Congress's power under
the Commerce Clause).
147. See Bilionis, supra note 35, at 500-02, 550-51 (describing Justices Kennedy and O'Connor as taking a more deferential approach to statutory review
than Chief Justice Rehnquist or Justices Scalia or Thomas, but observing that it
is uncertain to what extent they will allow congressional regulation of nontraditional intrastate activities); Boudreaux, supra note 94, at 543--47, 552-55,
563, 590 (discussing and criticizing the Rehnquist Court's use of "tradition" to restrict congressional authority under the Commerce Clause); Mank, supra note 5,
at 770-72 (same).
148. 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
149. 469 U.S. 528, 530 (1985).
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have treated environmental regulation as distinct from traditional land use regulation, but SWANCC in dicta suggested
otherwise.l 5o As Part V will show, the protection of endangered
species is not a traditional area of state regulation because the
federal government and state governments have exercised concurrent jurisdiction over these species for many decades.
The Lopez and Morrison decisions were wrong in asserting
that Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause is limited to the regulation of economic activities, that Congress may
not consider the aggregate impact of non-economic activities
such as violence against women on the national economy, that
federalist principles prohibit congressional regulation of intrastate activities, and that Congress may not regulate for moral
purposes. Nevertheless, even accepting their reasoning, Lopez
and Morrison did not overrule decisions applying the comprehensive statutory doctrine that Congress may regulate intrastate activities that are an integral part of a national regulatory scheme. Both because of the comprehensive scheme
rationale and because protection of endangered species is not a
traditional area of state regulation, Congress may regulate intrastate or economically insignificant species that in the aggregate do have a significant impact on interstate commerce.

150. Justice Blackmun, in his concurring opinion in National League of Cities,
stated that the decision "does not outlaw federal power in areas such as environmental protection, where the federal interest is demonstrably greater and where
state facility compliance with imposed federal standards would be essential." 426
U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring). In California Coastal Commission u.
Granite Rock Co., the Supreme Court recognized that federal environmental protection is distinct from state land use regulation. See 480 U.S. 572, 586-87
(1987); see also SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 191 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (rejecting the majority's suggestion that the Corps' interpretation of Clean Water Act
(CWA) allowing regulation of isolated wetlands infringed upon the traditional
state authority over land use because "[tJhe CWA is not a land-use code; it is a
paradigm of environmental regulation" and "[sJuch regulation is an accepted exercise of federal power."); Matthew B. Baumgartner, SWANCC's Clear Statement: A
Delimitation of Congress's Commerce Clause Authority to Regulate Water Pollution, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2137, 2158--60 (2005) ("The Court's recognition of environmentallaws as distinct from land use laws - even where there is some overlap
between the two - alleviates the concern underlying Lopez and Morrison about
federal infringement of states' rights.").
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DISTINGUISHING LOPEZ AND

MORRISON

In 2005, the Court addressed the scope of Lopez and Morrison in Gonzalez v. Raich, lSI which determined the constitutionality of the Controlled Substances Act. 152 The CSA prohibits
and criminalizes the possession, distribution, or manufacturing
of marijuana (cannabis) by intrastate growers and users.1 53 Although acknowledging that Congress has authority to regulate
interstate commerce in marijuana under the CSA, the respondents brought an action seeking injunctive and declaratory relief prohibiting the CSA's enforcement to the extent it prevented them from possessing, obtaining, or manufacturing
cannabis for their personal medical use under the California
Compassionate Use Act, which authorizes limited marijuana
use for medicinal purposes.1 54 After the district court denied
respondents' motion for a preliminary injunction, ISS the Ninth
Circuit reversed, finding that the respondents had demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the claim that the CSA
is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause
authority. 156 The Ninth Circuit relied heavily on Lopez and
Morrison in holding that "the intrastate, noncommercial cultivation and possession of cannabis for personal medical purposes as recommended by a patient's physician pursuant to
valid California state law" constituted a "separate and distinct
class of activities" that was beyond the reach of the otherwise

125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (2000). The CSA makes it unlawful to manufacture,
distribute, dispense, or possess any controlled substance except as authorized by
the Act. §§ 841(a)(1), 844(a); Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2203.
153. The CSA classifies marijuana as a Schedule I substance, based on its high
potential for abuse, no accepted medical use, and no accepted safety for use in
medically supervised treatment. 21 U.S.C. §§ 812(b)(1), 812(c). This classification renders the manufacture, distribution, or possession of marijuana a criminal
offense. Id. §§ 841(a)(1), 844(a); Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2204.
154. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 1996 & Supp. 2005); Raich,
125 S. Ct. at 2199-2200, 2204-05 n.3 ("The California Legislature recently enacted additional legislation supplementing the Compassionate Use Act." (citation
omitted».
ISS. See Raich v. Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp. 2d 918, 931 (N.D. Cal. 2003), rev'd,
352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003).
156. See Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1227 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd, 125 S.
Ct. 2195 (2005).
lSI.

152.
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valid federal authority to prohibit interstate commerce in cannabis. 157
The Raich Court, in an opinion by Justice Stevens, vacated
and remanded the decision of the Ninth Circuit holding that
the CSA did not exceed Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause as applied to the respondents because Congress
has the authority to regulate intrastate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce even if some of the individual
intrastate activities have only a "de minimis" impact on interstate commerce; as long as Congress has a rational basis for believing that the intrastate activities as a class "pose[ ] a threat
to a national market, it may regulate the entire class."158 Observing that "[t]he similarities between this case and Wickard
are striking," the Court maintained that the regulation of intrastate cultivation and use of marijuana was comparable to
the Court's approval of government regulation of intrastate cultivation and use of wheat in Wickard. 159 The Court concluded:
"Here too, Congress had a rational basis for concluding that

157. Id. at 1228; see also Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2201 (stating that the Ninth Circuit decision "placed heavy reliance on [the Supreme Court's] decisions" in Lopez
and Morrison).
158. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2205-06.
Our case law fIrmly establishes Congress's power to regulate purely local
activities that are part of an economic "class of activities" that have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce. As we stated in Wickard,
"even if appellee's activity be local and though it may not be regarded as
commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it
exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce." We have
never required Congress to legislate with scientific exactitude. When
Congress decides that the "total incidence" of a practice poses a threat to
a national market, it may regulate the entire class. In this vein, we have
reiterated that when "a general regulatory statute bears a substantial
relation to commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances
arising under that statute is of no consequence."
Id. (citations omitted); see also Pushaw, supra note 35, at 900-0l.
159. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2206--07.
Like the farmer in Wickard, respondents are cultivating, for home consumption, a fungible cQmmodity for which there is an established, albeit
illegal, interstate market. Just as the Agricultural Adjustment Act was
designed "to control the volume [of wheat] moving in interstate and foreign commerce in order to avoid surpluses ... and consequently control
the market price, a primary purpose of the CSA is to control the supply
and demand of controlled substances in both lawful and unlawful drug
markets.
Id. (citations omitted).
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leaving home-consumed marijuana outside federal control
would similarly affect price and market conditions."160
Rejecting the respondents' arguments that Lopez and Morrison had significantly restricted congressional authority under
the Commerce Clause, Justice Stevens emphasized that Lopez
and Morrison had not radically changed the Court's Commerce
Clause cases dating to 1937. He stated: "In their myopic focus,
they overlook the larger context of modern-era Commerce
Clause jurisprudence preserved by those cases. Moreover, even
in the narrow prism of respondents' creation, they read those
cases far too broadly."161 The Raich Court observed that the
respondents' challenge to the CSA was quite different from the
challenges in Lopez and Morrison because the "respondents ask
us to excise individual applications of a concededly valid statutory scheme. In contrast, in both Lopez and Morrison, the parties asserted that a particular statute or provision fell outside
Congress's commerce power in its entirety."162 By distinguishing Lopez and Morrison as decisions about single-subject statutes rather than comprehensive statutes, the Raich decision
gives Congress broad discretion to regulate non-economic, intrastate activities as long as it does so in a comprehensive statute.l 63

160. Id. at 2207.
161. Id. at 2209.
162. See id. at 2209. But see Douglas W. Kmiec, Gonzales v. Raich: Wickard v.
Filburn Displaced, 2004-2005 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 71, 87-88 (2005), available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/scr/2005/gonzalesdecision.pdf (criticizing Justice Stevens's distinction in Raich between facial and as-applied challenges as a false dichotomy obscuring the need to distinguish between national and local activities).
163. See Adler, supra note 14, at 764-65.
Thus, so long as a statute largely regulates economic or commercial activity - or defines a given activity at a level of generality sufficiently
broad to cover a substantial amount of economic activity - there is no
limit to the amount of non-commercial, intrastate activity that may also
succumb to federal power so long as Congress enacts a sufficiently expansive regulatory regime.
Id.; Ann Althouse, Why Not Heighten the Scrutiny of Congressional Power When
the States Undertake Policy Experiments?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 779, 783
(2005); Kmiec, supra note 162, at 98 ("It is enough that Congress could rationally
believe that regulating the activity (whether wholly local or not, and whether
commercial or not) was part of a comprehensive regulatory scheme or, in Congress's sole judgment, was necessary to make interstate regulation effective. Those
'tests' are without teeth."); John T. Parry, "Society Must be [Regulated}": Biopolitics and the Commerce Clause in Gonzales v. Raich, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 853,
859-60, 862 (2005); Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, What Hath Raich
Wrought? Five Takes, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 915, 922-23 (2005) (observing
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Justice Stevens argued that the respondents faced a more
difficult challenge in Raich because "[w]here the class of activities is regulated and that class is within the reach of federal
power, the courts have no power 'to excise, as trivial, individual
instances' of the class."164 Distinguishing Lopez, Justice Stevens maintained that the GFSZA "did not regulate any economic activity and did not contain any requirement that the
possession of a gun have any connection to past interstate activity or a predictable impact on future commercial activity."165
Thus, the GFSZA was "not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could
be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated."166
In contrast, the CSA's prohibition of intrastate cultivation and
use of marijuana, even for personal medical use under state
law, met Lopez's standard for valid congressional legislation
under the Commerce Clause because it was an essential part of
a comprehensive scheme that "'could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated."'167 Using a broad definition
of economics, the Raich Court stated that "[b]ecause the CSA is
a statute that directly regulates economic, commercial activity,
our opinion in Morrison casts no doubt on its constitutionality."168
that Raich's comprehensive scheme limitation of Lopez and Morrison was predicted by some commentators); Adrian Vermeule, Does Commerce Clause Review
Have Perverse Effects?, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1325, 1332-33 (2001) (predicting that the
Court could limit Lopez and Morrison by using comprehensive scheme rationale).
164. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2209 (quoting Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146,
154 (1971) (emphasis deleted».
165. Id.
166. Id. at 2209 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995».
167. Id. at 2210 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561).
168. Id. at 2211.
Unlike those at issue in Lopez and Morrison, the activities regulated by
the CSA are quintessentially economic. "Economics" refers to "the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities." Webster's Third
New International Dictionary 720 (1966). The CSA is a statute that
regulates the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities
for which there is an established, and lucrative, interstate market. Prohibiting the intrastate possession or manufacture of an article of commerce'is a rational (and commonly utilized) means of regulating commerce in that product.
Id.; see also Adler, supra note 14, at 763-64 (criticizing Raich's broad definition of
economic activity); Barnett, supra note 22, at 747 (same); Kmiec, supra note 162,
at 88-89 (pointing out that medicinal use involves no commercial transactions);
Parry, supra note 163, at 859-60 ("Congress is regulating economic activity in the
broad sense defined by Raich, which includes production, distribution, possession,
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In invalidating portions of the CSA, the Ninth Circuit
treated "the intrastate, noncommercial cultivation, possession
and use of marijuana for personal medical purposes on the advice of a physician and in accordance with state law" as a
"separate and distinct" class of activities "different in kind from
drug trafficking" that was beyond the scope of the Commerce
Clause. 169 The CSA, however, clearly rejected any medicinal
use of marijuana. 170 Furthermore, the Supreme Court was
concerned that the attempts by the Ninth Circuit and Justice
O'Connor, in her dissenting opinion, to treat such use as a
"separate and distinct" class of activities beyond federal authority would logically place any recreational, intrastate use of
the substance beyond federal regulation even if a state did not
authorize its recreational use and such recreational use would
clearly have substantial impacts on interstate commerce in the
drug. l7l Additionally, under the Supremacy Clause, a state's
attempt to treat certain types of drug use as a separate class of
activities distinct from the otherwise valid regulation of the
CSA must fail because any such exception would swallow congressional authority over states and interstate commerce. In
Because of the "enforcement difficulties" in "distinguishing
between marijuana cultivated locally and marijuana grown
elsewhere" and potential "diversion[s] into illicit channels,"173
the Court rejected arguments that intrastate cultivation and
use of marijuana for personal medical use under state law was
a separate class of activities from other intrastate or interstate
use. 174 The majority stated: "[W]e have no difficulty concluding

or consumption of a commodity that moves in interstate commerce or that either
effects interstate commerce or effects the regulation of interstate commerce.");
Pushaw, supra note 35, at 898-900.
This judicial debate fulfills my prediction that the Court's refusal in Lopez and Morrison to define "commerce," and its careless equation of that
word with "economics," would eventually sabotage its attempt to reform
Commerce Clause doctrine. Justice Stevens exploited that loose language by embracing the broadest possible meaning of "economics."
Id.
169. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2211 (quoting Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 122829 (9th Cir. 2003».
170. See id. at 2211-12.
171. See id. at 2211.
172. See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2212-15.
173. Id. at 2209.
174. See supra notes 157, 169, 171-72 and accompanying text; infra notes 23~
37,248 and accompanying text.
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that Congress had a rational basis for believing that failure to
regulate the intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana would leave a gaping hole in the CSA."175 Relying upon
the Commerce Clause as well as the Necessary and Proper
Clause, the Court concluded that Congress had the authority to
regulate all intrastate cultivation and use of marijuana even if
the respondents were correct that their individual use would
not affect interstate commerce. 176 "That the regulation ensnares some purely intrastate activity is of no moment. As we
have done many times before, we refuse to excise individual
components of that larger scheme."177
Although it is possible to distinguish the facts and comprehensive statutory scheme in Raich from the statutes at issue in
Lopez and Morrison, the approach to the Commerce Clause in
Justice Stevens's Raich majority opinion is closer to the Court's
pre-Lopez decisions. Justice Stevens and three of the four justices who joined his Raich majority opinion-Justices Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer-had all dissented in both Lopez and
Morrison so one may easily question whether they agree with
the spirit of those cases. 178 Justice Kennedy, who had been
. with the federalist majority in Lopez and Morrison, also joined
the Raich majority opinion. 179 Because he did not write a concurring opinion in Raich, it is impossible to know for sure why
Justice Kennedy believed that federal regulation of intrastate
medical marijuana was constitutional and thus different from
the activities at issue in Lopez and Morrison. However, his Lopez concurrence appeared to give greater latitude to congressional authority to regulate intrastate activities so long as the
legislation did not intrude on areas within the traditional state

175. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2209; Pushaw, supra note 35, at 900-0l.
176. See Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195; Adler, supra note 14, at 762-77 (arguing that
Raich effectively overruled most of Lopez and Morrison where the litigant challenges a law as applied); Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 14, at 494-98 (discussing
Raich's use of the comprehensive scheme principle and arguing that Raich increases the probability that the Supreme Court will find the Endangered Species
Act constitutional); Pushaw, supra note 35, at 900-0l.
177. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2209.
178. See Althouse, supra note 163, at 782 ("Stevens, like three other members
of the Raich majority, dissented in Lopez and Morrison, and presumably has little
interest in nurturing the commercial/noncommercial distinction. I would expect
these four Justices some time soon to cite Raich for the proposition that the commercial/noncommercial distinction has been abandoned." (citation omitted».
179. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2197.
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police power. 180 In cases involving a comprehensive statutory
scheme, the Raich decision signals that the Court will apply a
deferential rational basis approach in deciding whether Congress may regulate non-economic, intrastate activities if such
regulation is necessary to effectuate regulation of interstate
commerce as part of a comprehensive statutory scheme. 181 As
the conclusion will show, after Raich, there is a much stronger
probability that the Court will uphold the constitutionality of
the ESA under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and
Proper Clause. 182
IV. JUSTICE SCALIA'S RAlCH CONCURRENCE: THE NECESSARY
AND PROPER CLAUSE

Justice Scalia's concurrence relied on the Necessary and
Proper Clause rather than the majority's comprehensive
scheme rationale to justify congressional regulation of medical
marijuana under the Commerce Clause. His approach to the
Necessary and Proper Clause provides a second and separate
argument for regulating endangered species under the Commerce Clause.

180. See generally United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 576-81 (1995) (Ken·
nedy, J., concurring); Adler, supra note 14, at 768-70 (discussing possible reasons
why Justice Kennedy joined Raich majority opinion); Althouse, supra note 105, at
801-04 (discussing Justice Kennedy's "pragmatic" concurrence in Lopez as being
more moderate than Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion); Mank, supra
note 5, at 740-41 (discussing Justice Kennedy's "pragmatic" approach in rejecting
federal interference with education, a traditional state concern); McAllister, supra
note 105, at 238-42 (praising Justice Kennedy's "pragmatic" approach to federalism as model for future cases); supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
181. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2210; Barnett, supra note 22, at 747.
The majority in Raich adopted the most deferential version of the rational basis test. This is, perhaps, the most dangerous aspect of the
Court's holding (and Justice Scalia's concurrence). Any heightened scrutiny provided by Lopez and Morrison could be evaded by a traditional rational basis approach to determining whether it is "essential" to reach
the intrastate activity in question.
Id.; Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 14, at 494-98 (discussing Raich's use of the
comprehensive scheme principle and arguing that Raich increases the probability
that the Supreme Court will find the ESA constitutional).
182. Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 14, at 494-98 (discussing Raich's use of
the comprehensive scheme principle and arguing that Raich increases the probability that the Supreme Court will fmd the ESA constitutional); see also Adler,
supra note 14, at 762-65 (arguing Raich effectively overruled most of Lopez and
Morrison where the litigant challenges the law as applied).
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A. Justice Scalia's Raich Concurrence
Although Justice Scalia agreed with the Court's holding,
he concurred separately in the judgment. 183 He explained,
"[M]y understanding of the doctrinal foundation on which that
holding rests is, if not inconsistent with that of the Court, at
least more nuanced."184 Justice Scalia argued that the substantial effects test "is misleading because, unlike the channels, instrumentalities, and agents of interstate commerce, activities that substantially affect interstate commerce are not
themselves part of interstate commerce, and thus the power to
regulate them cannot come from the Commerce Clause
alone."185 Instead, he contended that since 1838 the Court had
recognized that "Congress's regulatory authority over intrastate activities that are not themselves part of interstate commerce (including activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce) derives from the Necessary and Proper
Clause."186 Furthermore, he argued that "[w]here necessary to
make a regulation of interstate commerce effective, Congress
may regulate even those intrastate activities that do not themselves substantially affect interstate commerce."187 In contrast
to the majority opinion, which only mentioned the Necessary

183. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2198, 2215-20 (Scalia, J., concurring); Adler, supra
note 14, at 766--68 (discussing Justice Scalia's Raich concurrence).
.
184. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2215 (Scalia, J., concurring). But see Adler, supra
note 14, at 762-63 ("Justice Scalia's concurrence, while providing a more nu·
anced-and perhaps a more doctrinally satisfying-rationale, was no less expansive in its impact. Both the majority and concurring opinions hollowed out Morrison's core-leaving it without any substance, if any life at all."); Kmiec, supra note
162, at 73, 90-91, 99 (criticizing Justice Scalia's Raich concurrence as imposing no
meaningful restrictions on congressional power and ignoring original intent of
framers in creating federalist structure in Constitution).
185. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2215-16 (Scalia, J. concurring) (second emphasis
added).
186. [d. at 2216 (citing Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 301-02 (1964);
United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942); Shreveport Rate
Cases, 234 U.S. 342, 353 (1914); United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 3940 (1895) (Harlan, J., dissenting); United States v. Coombs, 37 U.s. (12 Pet.) 72,
78 (1838»); Gardbaum, supra note 81, at 807-11 (arguing courts and scholars have
under-appreciated the role of the Necessary and Proper Clause in the development of Commerce Clause doctrine); Seinfeld, supra note 21, at 1288--91 (arguing
Congress's expanded power to regulate commerce came not from direct power under the Commerce Clause, but rather from an interplay between the Commerce
Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause).
187. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2216 (Scalia, J. concurring); see Pushaw, supra note
35, at 901-02.
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and Proper Clause, Justice Scalia placed far more emphasis on
that Clause. Indeed, Justice Scalia quoted and applied Chief
Justice Marshall's opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland. 188
Justice Scalia argued that many of the Court's important
Commerce Clause cases were in fact based in part on the Necessary and Proper Clause, and had reached intrastate activities
under the latter Clause that they could not have reached under
the former Clause alone.l 89 He maintained that the Necessary
and Proper Clause applied in "two general circumstances."190
First and "[m]ost directly," he cited the Jones & Laughlin Steel
decision for the principle that "the commerce power permits
Congress not only to devise rules for the governance of commerce between States but also to facilitate interstate commerce
by eliminating potential obstructions, and to restrict it by
eliminating potential stimulants."191
Although Lopez and Morrison had limited the substantial
effects test where it might "obliterate the distinction between
what is national and what is local"192 and had "rejected the argument that Congress may regulate non-economic activity
based solely on the effect that it may have on interstate commerce through a remote chain of inferences,"193 Justice Scalia
argued that the Lopez decision had "implicitly acknowledged"
that "Congress's authority to enact laws necessary and proper
for the regulation of interstate commerce is not limited to laws
directed against economic activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce."194 Neither Lopez nor Morrison
had directly invoked or discussed the Necessary and Proper
188. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421-22 (1819); see Reynolds & Denning, supra
note 163, at 925.
189. Baick, 125 S. Ct. at 2216-18 (Scalia, J., concurring); Blumm & Kimbrell,
supra note 14, at 496 (discussing Justice Scalia's Baick concurrence, which emphasized the Necessary and Proper Clause); Claeys, supra note 19, at 814-15
(same); Pushaw, supra note 35, at 901-02 (same).
190. Baick, 125 S. Ct. at 2216 (Scalia, J., concurring).
191. Id. (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 36-37
(1937».

192. Id. at 2216 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
(quoting A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,

(1935»).

549, 566-67 (1995)
295 U.S. 495, 554

193. Id. at 2217 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564-66 and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-18 (2000»; see Pushaw, supra note 35, at 901-02 (discussing Lopez's and Morrison's reasoning that Congress may not justify regulation
under Commerce Clause by relying on remote, attenuated impacts); Seinfeld, supra note 21, at 1269-76.
194. Baick, 125 S. Ct. at 2217 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Clause. 195 He claimed that the Lopez decision had recognized
that Congress could regulate non-economic, intrastate activities that are "'an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated."'196 He
argued that the Lopez decision meant by this statement to refer
to previous decisions "permitting the regulation of intrastate
activities 'which in a substantial way interfere with or obstruct
the exercise of the granted power."'197 He suggested that the
Lopez Court would have approved the statement in the Court's
Wrightwood Dairy decision that "where Congress has the authority to enact a regulation of interstate commerce, 'it possesses every power needed to make that regulation effective."'198
Justice Scalia argued that the power under the Necessary
and Proper Clause "'to make ... regulation effective'" is "distinct" from congressional authority under the Commerce
Clause to regulate economic activities that substantially affect
interstate commerce, although he acknowledged that the two
types of authority "commonly overlap[]" and that they "may in
some cases have been confused."199 He contended that congressional power to regulate under the Necessary and Proper
Clause is broader than under the Commerce Clause because
"[t]he regulation of an intrastate activity may be essential to a
comprehensive regulation of interstate commerce even though
the intrastate activity does not itself 'substantially affect' inter-

195. See Beck, supra note 46, at 584, 616, 624-26, 648-49 (observing neither
Lopez nor Morrison had invoked the Necessary and Proper Clause, but arguing
both cases roughly followed the Clause's jurisprudence as defined in McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421-422 (1819»; Gardbaum, supra note 81, at
811 (observing that Lopez had not acknowledged Congress's authority under the
Necessary and Proper Clause).
196. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2217 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S.
at 561).
197. Id. (quoting United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119
(1942), and citing United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118-19 (1941) and
Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.s. 342, 353 (1914».
198. Id. (quoting Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. at 118-19); see Beck, supra
note 46, at 619 (discussing Wrightwood Dairy's invocation of the Necessary and
Proper Clause); Gardbaum, supra note 81, at 809-10 (same).
199. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2217 (Scalia, J. concurring) (quoting Wrightwood
Dairy Co., 315 U.S. at 119); ct. John T. Valauri, The Clothes Have No Emperor, or,
Cabining the Commerce Clause, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 405, 425-35 (2004) (arguing that the Necessary and Proper Clause is essential for Congress to exercise
broad authority under Commerce Clause).
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state commerce."200 Furthermore, as Lopez suggested,201 Justice Scalia argued that "Congress may regulate even noneconomic local activity if that regulation is a necessary part of a
more general regulation of interstate commerce."202 He asserted that in determining congressional power to regulate under the Necessary and Proper Clause that "[t]he relevant question is simply whether the means chosen are 'reasonably
adapted' to the attainment of a legitimate end under the commerce power ."203
For example, Justice Scalia observed that in the important
Darby 204 case, the Court reached some intrastate activities under the Commerce Clause, but relied on the Necessary and
Proper Clause to affirm Congress's requirement that employers
keep employment records to demonstrate compliance with the
FLSA regulatory scheme "on the sole ground that '[t]he requirement for records even of the intrastate transaction is an
appropriate means to the legitimate end."'205 Justice Scalia observed that in 1914, long before the Jones & Laughlin Steel decision, the Court in the Shreveport Rate Cases stated that the
Necessary and Proper Clause "does not give 'Congress ... the
authority to regulate the internal commerce of a State, as
such,' but it does allow Congress 'to take all measures necessary or appropriate to' the effective regulation of the interstate
market, 'although intrastate transactions ... may thereby be
controlled."'206 He noted that the Jones & Laughlin Steel decision had concluded that the Shreveport Rate Cases' broad apRaich, 125 S. Ct. at 2217 (Scalia, J. concurring).
Id. (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561).
Id. (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561).
Id. (quoting United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 121 (1941».
204. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
205. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2217-18 (alteration in original) (quoting Darby, 312
U.S. at 125); see Beck, supra note 46, at 618-19 (discussing Darby's invocation of
the Necessary and Proper Clause); David E. Engdahl, The Necessary and Proper
Clause as an Intrinsic Restraint on Federal Lawmaking Power, 22 HARv. J.L. &
PuB. POL'y 107, 110-11 (1998) ("The Court also upheld ... the wage and hour
terms of the Act [in Darby], relying not on the Commerce Clause itself, but [on] ..
. the Necessary and Proper Clause."); Gardbaum, supra note 81, at 809 (discussing Darby's invocation of the Necessary and Proper Clause); Seinfeld, supra note
21, at 1297-1300 (criticizing Darby's interpretation of the Necessary and Proper
Clause as overly broad); Valauri, supra note 199, at 427-28 (arguing that the Supreme Court in Darby recognized the limits of congressional authority under the
Necessary and Proper Clause).
206. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2218 (Scalia, J., concurring) (alteration in original)
(quoting Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342, 353 (1914».
200.
201.
202.
203.
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proach to congressional authority under the Necessary and
Proper Clause to implement Congress's authority under the
Commerce Clause "[was] not limited to" the regulation of "instrumentalities of commerce," but that Shreveport's logic applied as well to the congressional regulation of intrastate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. 207
Justice Scalia rejected Justice O'Connor's argument that
''by permitting Congress to regulate activities necessary to effective interstate regulation, the Court reduces Lopez and Morrison to little 'more than a drafting guide."'208 He maintained
that congressional authority under the Necessary and Proper
Clause to implement Congress's authority under the Commerce
Clause was limited because "the power to enact laws enabling
effective regulation of interstate commerce can only be exercised in conjunction with congressional regulation of an interstate market, and it extends only to those measures necessary
to make the interstate regulation effective."209 Defending the
majority opinion, he argued, "As Lopez itself states, and the
Court affirms today, Congress may regulate non-economic intrastate activities only where the failure to do so 'could ... undercut' its regulation of interstate commerce."210
He concluded that congressional authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause to enact those measures necessary to
make the interstate regulation effective "is not a power that
threatens to obliterate the line between 'what is truly national
and what is truly local."'211
According to Justice Scalia, Lopez and Morrison had clarified that Congress may not use the Commerce Clause to "regulate certain 'purely local' activity within the States based solely
on the attenuated effect that such activity may have in the interstate market."212 Neither case, however, had "declare[d]
non-economic intrastate activities to be categorically beyond
the reach of the Federal Government."213 Lopez and Morrison
had not "involved the power of Congress to exert control over

207. [d. (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 38 (1937».
208. [d. (quoting id. at 2223 (O'Connor, J., dissenting».
209. [d.
210. [d. (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995» (alteration
in original).
211. [d. (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68).
212. [d. at 2218.
213. [d.; Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 14, at 495.
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intrastate activities in connection with a more comprehensive
scheme of regulation."214 Indeed, according to Justice Scalia,
"Lopez expressly disclaimed that it was such a case."215 Although the Supreme Court in Morrison did not address
whether it was a case involving a comprehensive scheme, the
court of appeals' decision below "made clear that it was not."216
Thus, he contended that Justice O'Connor's claim that there
was no significant difference between the comprehensive
scheme of the CSA and the more limited statutory regimes in
Lopez and Morrison "misunderstand[s] the nature of the Necessary and Proper Clause, which empowers Congress to enact
laws in effectuation of its enumerated powers that are not
within its authority to enact in isolation."217
Justice Scalia argued that "there are other restraints upon
the Necessary and Proper Clause authority."218 He observed
that Chief Justice Marshall had written in McCulloch v. Maryland,219 the first important Court case to address the Necessary and Proper Clause, that "even when the end is constitutional and legitimate, the means must be 'appropriate' and
'plainly adapted' to that end."220 Also, Chief Justice Marshall

214. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2218 (Scalia, J., concurring); Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 14, at 495.
215. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2218 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at
561).
216. Id. (citing Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst., 169 F.3d 820, 834-35 (4th
Cir. 1999) (en bane».
217. Id. (quoting id. at 2223 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); citing McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421-22 (1819».
218. Id.
219. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421-22.
220. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2218--19 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting McCulloch,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421); Gardbaum, supra note 81, at 812-17 (arguing Necessary and Proper Clause as interpreted by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v.
Maryland places limits on national power and respects federalist principles); Gary
Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper" Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 286--89 (1993)
(same). Some commentators have contended that the McCulloch decision did not
primarily rely on the Necessary and Proper Clause. See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker,
"Appropriate" Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. REV.
1127, 1134 n.33 (2001) ("Chief Justice Marshall did not rely on the text of the Necessary and Proper Clause to confer broad legislative authority on Congress;
rather, he merely interpreted the Clause as confIrming his preceding structural
argument concerning the broad scope of implied congressional powers."); see also
Seinfeld, supra note 21, at 1289 n.161 (discussing Caminker's argument that
McCulloch did not rely on the Necessary and Proper Clause). Even if these scholars are right, the McCulloch decision has strongly influenced the Court's understanding of the Clause. See Beck, supra note 46, at 584, 616, 624-26, 648--49 (ob-
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had stated that the means "may not be otherwise 'prohibited'
and must be 'consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution."'221 Justice Scalia maintained that two Court decisions
from the 1990s prohibiting the federal government from forcing
state officials to enforce federal laws, Printz v. United States 222
and New York v. United States,223 "affirm that a law is not
'proper for carrying into Execution the Commerce Clause
'[w]hen [it] violates [~ constitutional] principle of state sovereignty."'224 Thus, he suggested that the Necessary and Proper
Clause respected federalist principles and would not obliterate
the line between state and national authority.225
Addressing the facts in Raich, Justice Scalia argued that
the Commerce Clause clearly authorized Congress to prohibit
all commerce in marijuana, including non-economic possession
for personal medical use, "as a necessary part of a larger regulation."226 He agreed with the majority opinion that Congress
could appropriately prohibit all economic and non-economic use
of marijuana because it is a "fungible commodit[y]" and, therefore, any marijuana used for personal medical reasons could
easily be diverted to the interstate market in the drug. 227
Based on McCulloch's principle that Congress does not have to
trust state laws to accomplish a federal purpose, Justice Scalia

serving neither Lopez nor Morrison had invoked the Necessary and Proper
Clause, but arguing both cases roughly followed the Clause as defined in
McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421-22); Gardbaum, supra note 81, at 820-22,
831 (arguing courts should follow McCulloch's approach to interpreting Congress's
authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause); Seinfeld, supra note 21, at
1289 n.161, 1292-97 (arguing McCulloch decision has strongly influenced the
Court's understanding of the Clause even if that case did not actually rely on the
Clause).
221. Id. at 2219 (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421).
222. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
223. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
224. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2219 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Printz, 521 U.S.
at 923-24; citing New York, 505 U.S. at 166) (alteration in original); see also Beck,
supra note 46, at 628-32 (discussing Printz, New York and Necessary and Proper
Clause).
225. See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2219 (Scalia, J., concurring); Gardbaum, supra
note 81, at 812-31 (arguing Necessary and Proper Clause places limits on national power and respects federalist principles); Lawson & Granger, supra note
220, at 271-72 (same). But see Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2226 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(arguing Necessary and Proper Clause does not give Congress unlimited power to
undermine federalist principles); Pushaw, supra note 35, at 903 (same); Reynolds
& Denning, supra note 163, at 924-26 (same).
226. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2219 (Scalia, J., concurring).
227. Id.
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concluded that Congress in the CSA could reasonably conclude
that it was necessary to enact a total prohibition on marijuana
use rather than relying on state laws restricting the drug's use
to medical purposes that might not be effective. 228

B. Raich's Dissenting Opinions
Three of the five justices who comprised the majority in
Lopez and Morrison dissented in Raich because they found that
its interpretation of the Commerce Clause was inconsistent
with those decisions: Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor
and Justice Thomas. 229
1.

Justice O'Connor's Dissenting Opinion

In her dissenting opinion, Justice O'Connor, who was
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas,230 argued that both the majority opinion and Justice Scalia's concurring opinion were inconsistent with Lopez and Morrison as
well as broader federalist principles because they allowed Congress to regulate non-economic, intrastate activities. 231 Justice
O'Connor criticized both the majority and Justice Scalia for using the comprehensive scheme rationale to evade federalist
limits on congressional authority.232 She argued that the Government had failed to demonstrate "that the possession and
use of homegrown marijuana for medical purposes, in California or elsewhere, has a substantial effect on interstate commerce" or "that regulating such activity is necessary to an interstate regulatory scheme."233
She also criticized the

228.

Id. at 2219-20 (citing McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 424).
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion in both Lopez and
Morrison, joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Lopez, 514
U.S. at 550; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 600. Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer dissented in each case. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 550; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 600.
230. Justice Thomas did not join Part III of Justice O'Connor's dissenting opin·
ion, which expressed her personal view that if she were a California citizen or legislator that she would not have supported California's law exempting certain categories of medical marijuana use. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2198; id. at 2220, 2229
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
231. Id. at 2221-24 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Pushaw, supra note 35, at 89899.
232. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2221-23 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Pushaw, supra
note 35, at 903.
233. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2226 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

229.
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majority's and Justice Scalia's use of the Necessary and Proper
Clause to justify congressional regulation of medical marijuana
because Congress's authority under the Necessary and Proper
Clause had to be "consistent with basic constitutional principles," including federalism. 234 She argued that the majority's
and Justice Scalia's approach to the Necessary and Proper
Clause would logically have led the Court in Lopez to conclude
that the GFSZA was constitutional under the Commerce
Clause because possession of guns could "conceivabl[y]" have
substantial impacts on interstate commerce. 235
Addressing Congress's authority to regulate personal, medicinal use of marijuana despite state laws authorizing and
regulating its use, Justice O'Connor contended that "[t]here is
simply no evidence that homegrown medicinal marijuana users
constitute, in the aggregate, a sizable enough class to have a
discernable, let alone substantial, impact on the national illicit
drug market-or otherwise to threaten the CSA regime."236
She argued that the respondents had demonstrated that such
users were a separate class from recreational users of the drug
and that the government had failed to demonstrate any diversion of medicinal marijuana into interstate markets. 237
Justice O'Connor appropriately questioned whether the
majority's deferential rational basis standard of review would
have led it to decide that the VAWA at issue in Morrison was
constitutional because of the congressional findings in the statute's legislative history concluding that gender-based violence
has significant impacts on interstate commerce. 238 Her dissenting opinion failed, however, to grapple with the numerous
decisions that Lopez and Morrison had not overruled and that
the Court had never changed the deferential rational basis

234. Id.; Pushaw, supra note 35, at 903.
235. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2226 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Indeed, if it were enough in "substantial effects" cases for the Court to
supply conceivable justifications for intrastate regulation related to an
interstate market, then we could have surmised in Lopez that guns in
school zones are "never more than an instant from the interstate market" in guns already subject to extensive federal regulation, ... recast
Lopez as a Necessary and Proper Clause case, and thereby upheld the
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990.
Id. (quoting id. at 2219 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (citation omitted».
236. Id.
237. Id. at 2226-29.
238. Id. at 2227-28.
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standard of review that it had used since 1937. 239 The majority
opinion and even Justice Scalia's concurrence may be at odds
with the spirit if not the letter of Lopez and Morrison, but
surely these opinions are consistent with Wickard, Darby, Hodel and Wrightwood Dairy, which remain good law.
In her dissenting opinion in Garcia, Justice O'Connor acknowledged that under the Commerce Clause "[e]ven if a particular individual's activity has no perceptible interstate effect,
it can be reached by Congress through regulation of that class
of activity in general as long as that class, considered as a
whole, affects interstate commerce."240 As Part V will show,
courts have and should consider endangered and threatened
species as a class rather than individual species. Her dissenting opinion in Garcia emphasized the need for the Court to
balance national interests against state autonomy.241 Part V
will demonstrate that the ESA respects that balance. Although
her retirement moots the issue, it is possible that Justice
O'Connor would have voted in favor of the constitutionality of
the ESA if the issue had come before her.242
2.

Justice Thomas's dissenting opinion

In a solo dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas argued that
the federal government may not regulate intrastate growth and
consumption of marijuana "that has never been bought or sold,
that has never crossed state lines, and that has had no demonstrable effect on the national market for marijuana."243 Applying a narrow definition of the Commerce Clause's original
meaning that interprets the Clause only to "empower[ ] Con-

239. See supra notes 36-80 and accompanying text; infra notes 390-95 and accompanying text.
240. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 584 (1985)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
241. Id. at 584-89.
242. See Mank, supra note 5, at 734 (speculating that Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy might support the constitutionality of the ESA); cf. Babbitt v. Sweet
Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 708-09 (1995) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (approving agency's broad interpretation of the term "take" under
the ESA). See generally Byron Dailey, Note, The Five Faces of Federalism: A
State-Power Quintet Without a Theory, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1243, 1274-77, 1280-82,
1286-87 (2001) (arguing Justices O'Connor and Kennedy apply more a moderate
approach to state rights and national power issues than Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Justice Scalia, and, particularly, Justice Thomas).
243. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2229 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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gress to regulate the buying and selling of goods and services
trafficked across state lines," he concluded that the respondent's intrastate use did not constitute "commerce" as defined
by the Clause. 244 Other justices and many commentators have
disagreed with Justice Thomas's narrow reading of the Commerce Clause's original meaning or are unwilling to overrule
decades of precedent authorizing Congress to use the Clause to
regulate many economic activities beyond mere transportation
of goods. 245
Justice Thomas acknowledged that whether the CSA's
prohibition of personal medical use of marijuana that is grown
and consumed entirely in one state is authorized by the Necessary and Proper Clause is a more difficult issue than whether
the statute's prohibition is valid under the Commerce Clause
alone. 246 Quoting Chief Justice Marshall's McCulloch opinion,
Justice Thomas observed that Congress, to act under the Necessary and Proper Clause, "must select a means that is 'appropriate' and 'plainly adapted' to executing an enumerated power;
the means cannot be otherwise 'prohibited' by the Constitution;
and the means cannot be inconsistent with 'the letter and spirit
of the Constitution."'247 Applying the McCulloch standard, he
concluded that the CSA's regulation of the respondents' conduct was not a valid exercise of Congress's power under the
Necessary and Proper Clause because the respondents' medicinal use of the drug was separate and distinct from the commercial, interstate market in the drug, especially due to the restrictions on medicinal use in California's Compassionate Use
Act.248 Even if it was correct that a small amount of medicinal
marijuana was in fact diverted to commercial, interstate markets, he asserted that the Government had failed to demon244. [d. at 2229-30 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 586-89 (1995)
(Thomas, J., dissenting».
245. See, e.g., Mank, supra note 5, at 745; Kmiec, supra note 162, at 92-94 ("In
his Raich dissent, Thomas does not discuss how he would reconcile the commerce
power, properly limited, and the modern regulatory state, but he clearly indicates
that if a satisfactory answer is to be found, it is best guided by original understanding."); Pushaw, supra note 35, at 905, 907 (observing that Thomas's originalist approach to Commerce Clause would require Court to overrule decades of
precedent and raises many practical difficulties).
246. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2230 (footnotes omitted).
247. [d. at 2231 (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413-15
(1819); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST
HUNDRED YEARS 1789-1888, at 163-64 (1985».
248. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2231-32.
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strate that the CSA's prohibition on all medicinal use was
"necessary" to achieve the statute's goals when the huge volume of commercial marijuana is compared to the tiny amount
of medical marijuana that could be diverted. 249
Additionally, Justice Thomas argued that "[e]ven assuming
the CSA's ban on locally cultivated and consumed marijuana is
'necessary,' that does not mean it is also 'proper."'250 He argued
that using the Necessary and Proper Clause to prohibit intrastate, noncommercial cultivation and consumption of marijuana was inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution's federalist structure and principles because the CSA
impermissibly imposed a general police power over noncommercial, intrastate activities. 251
Justice Thomas's originalist approach to the Commerce
Clause and his narrow interpretation of McCulloch are inconsistent with decades of precedent allowing broad congressional
regulation of economic activities beyond mere transportation of
goods. 252 In light of his narrow, originalist interpretation of the
Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause, Justice Thomas is the Justice who is most likely to hold that the
ESA is unconstitutional, at least in regard to intrastate or
commercially valueless species.
V.

THE ESA's COMPREHENSIVE SCHEME FOR PROTECTING ALL
ENDANGERED SPECIES IS A "NECESSARY AND PROPER"
MEANS TO REGULATE INTERSTATE COMMERCE

In light of Raich and a series of Commerce Clause decisions from Darby to Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining, this Part
demonstrates that the ESA is constitutional under the Commerce Clause because it does not interfere with traditional
state authority as the protection of threatened species has been
a concurrent area of state and federal responsibility for many
decades. Furthermore, comprehensive national regulation of
these species prevents a "race to the bottom" among states.
Additionally, the ESA's aggregation of all endangered species is

249. Id.at 2233.
250. Id. at 2233.
251. Id. at 2233-34.
252. Ct. Pushaw, supra note 35, at 905, 907 (observing that Thomas's originalist approach to Commerce Clause would require Court to overrule decades of
precedent and raises many practical difficulties).
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necessary and proper because it serves several reasonable congressional purposes in protecting the biodiversity of important
ecosystems that have significant current and potential future
benefits. For all these reasons, it is appropriate for courts to
defer to Congress's comprehensive scheme in the ESA under a
rational basis standard of review.

A. After Lopez and Morrison, Is the Endangered Species
Act Constitutional Under the Commerce Clause?
In enacting the 1973 ESA to protect a wide range of endangered and threatened species, "Congress primarily relied on
its power under the Commerce Clause."253 The text and the
legislative history of the 1973 ESA justified regulation of endangered and threatened species under the Commerce Clause
both by discussing their actual and potential impact on interstate commerce and also by explaining that commercial development affecting interstate commerce was a primary cause of
their extinction. 254
Under its deferential approach to the

253. Mank, supra note 9, at 937-38; see Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 496-98; Nagle, suo
pra note 5, at 192-93. "[Congress] also continued to use its authority under the
Property Clause to regulate federal lands and the Spending Clause to regulate
federal agencies and provide incentives for cooperation by states." Mank, supra
note 9, at 937.
254. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(3) (stating that species threatened with extinction
are of "esthetic, ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and scientific
value to the Nation and its people"); id. § 1531(a)(1) (stating that "various species
of fish, wildlife, and plants in the United States have been rendered extinct as a
consequence of economic growth and development untempered by adequate con·
cern and conservation"); H.R. REP. No. 93-412, at 4-5 (1973) Gustifying the protection of endangered species under the Commerce Clause on the potential future
economic and medical benefits of preserving a wide variety of species and a robust
genetic heritage).
The value of this genetic heritage is, quite literally, incalculable . . . .
Who knows, or can say, what potential cures for cancer or other
scourges, present or future, may lie locked up in the structures of plants
which may yet be undiscovered, much less analyzed? More to the point,
who is prepared to risk being [sic] those potential cures by eliminating
those plants for all time? Sheer self interest impels us to be cautious.
Id. See generally Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 496-98 (discussing emphasis on future economic and medical benefits in 1973 ESA's legislative history and concluding that
congressional concern for future economic benefits was appropriate basis for national regulation under Commerce Clause); NAHB, 130 F.3d 1041, 1052-54 (D.C.
Cir. 1997) (same); Mank, supra note 5, at 729-30, 756-57, 789-92 (arguing that
Congress, in the 1973 ESA legislative history, emphasized concern for future economic and medical benefits); Mank, supra note 9, at 937-38 (same); Nagle, supra
note 5, at 193 (same).
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Commerce Clause in 1973, the Court almost certainly would
have upheld the constitutionality of the ESA.
The Lopez, Morrison, and SWANCC decisions raise serious
questions about whether many of the species protected by the
ESA have sufficient impacts on interstate commerce to justify
regulation under the Commerce Clause, but ultimately those
questions are answered by the comprehensive scheme and Necessary and Proper justifications in Raich for regulating intrastate activities. 255 About half of all endangered or threatened
species have habitats limited to one state, and many intrastate
species have little economic value in interstate commerce. 256
Similarly, many other threatened or endangered species that
cross state lines lack significant commercial value. 257 Accordingly, in recent years, three federal courts of appeals have applied different and sometimes clearly contradictory rationales
to justify regulation of endangered species under the Commerce Clause. 258 It is not surprising that courts have struggled
255. See supra notes 4-10 and accompanying text; infra notes 256-59 and ac·
companying text.
256. See, e.g., GDF, 326 F.3d 622, 624 (5th Cir. 2003) (six species of subterranean, cave-dwelling invertebrate spiders and beetles living only in Texas); Rancho
Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (arroyo toad living only
in California); NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1043 (Delhi Sand Flower-Loving Fly living only
in California); id. at 1052 (half of endangered species living in one state); id. at
1058 (Henderson, J., concurring) (Delhi Sand Flower-Loving Fly living only in
California). Hawaii has the most species that are found in only one state. See
DAVID QUAMMEN, THE SONG OF THE DODO: ISLAND BIOGEOGRAPHY IN AN AGE OF
EXTINCTIONS 19, 41, 214, 230-32, 252, 256, 264, 313-21, 342-43, 379, 606 (1996)
(discussing unique extinct and endangered species on islands comprising Hawaii);
Anne McKibbin, The Whole-Ecosystem Approach to the Commerce Clause and
Article III Standing in Environmental Cases 15-16 (Sept. 28, 2004),
http://ssrn.comlabstract=597104(''Thirty-six endangered and two threatened
animal species exist only in Hawaii"; based on information downloaded from U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service's website on Feb. 28, 2004). According to a 2004 study,
thirty-one states, two territories, and the District of Columbia contain at least one
isolated, intrastate species listed as endangered or threatened. McKibbin, supra,
at 16 (listing the following: AL, AR, AZ, CA, CO, DC, FL, GA, HI, !D, IL, KY,LA,
MA, MD, MI, MN, MO, MS, NC, NE, NM, NY, NY, OH, OR, Puerto Rico, TN, TX,
UT, VA, VI, WA, WI, WV, WY, and Guam; based on information downloaded from
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's website on Feb. 28, 2004). A list of all threatened
and endangered species is available at the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's website at http://www.fws.gov/endangeredlwildlife.html#Species.
257. See, e.g., GDF, 326 F.3d at 624-25 (six species of subterranean, cave
dwelling invertebrate spiders and beetles with no commercial value); Rancho
Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1072 (arroyo toad with no commercial value); NAHB, 130 F.3d
at 1053 n.14 (Wald, J.), 1063 n.1, 1066 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (Delhi Sand
Flower-Loving Fly with no commercial value).
258. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text; infra notes 340-46, 381-85
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to apply the rationales in the Lopez, Morrison and SWANCC
decisions to the ESA because the Supreme Court in those cases
failed to: (1) define which types of "traditional" state regulatory
activity are protected from federal regulation under federalist
principles; (2) explain the line between economic and noneconomic activities; or (3) articulate when Congress may regulate intrastate non-economic activities as part of a comprehensive legislative scheme. 259
The Raich Court's highly deferential approach to evaluating the constitutionality of comprehensive statutory schemes
under the Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause
enables a court reviewing the constitutionality of the ESA to
avoid these three complex and confusing issues. Regulation of
intrastate species under the ESA is constitutional under the
Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause because, as will be shown in Parts Band C, there is a rational basis for including intrastate and commercially insignificant species within the ESA's comprehensive scheme. Therefore, such
regulation is consistent with federalist principles. 26o
B. The ESA Does Not Interfere with Traditional State
Authority
Both the Lopez and Morrison decisions emphasized the
importance of preserving traditional state regulatory authority
from federal usurpation as a factor in Commerce Clause analysis. 261 In dicta, the SWANCC decision added state and local
government's land use decisions as another area of traditional
state authority that should be protected from overly broad federal regulation under the guise of the Commerce Clause. 262
Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Raich took a broad view
of congressional authority under the Necessary and Proper

and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 127-50 and accompanying text.
260. See infra notes 298, 311-13, 315-20, 369-74, 402-04, 411-13, 417 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 94, 101, 105, 114-15, 118, 125-26 and accompanying text.
262. See SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 173 (2001) (stating broad interpretation of
federal authority over isolated waters would "alter[ ] the federal-state framework
by permitting federal encroachment upon a traditional state power"); Mank, supra
note 5, at 769-73 (discussing SWANCC's dicta discussion of Commerce Clause
and traditional state authority); Mank, supra note 9, at 929, 959 (same); supra
notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
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Clause to effectuate federal regulation under the Commerce
Clause, but also emphasized that federal authority under either Clause was limited by fundamental federalist principles in
the Constitution. 263 On the other hand, the majority in Raich
implicitly gave less deference to traditional state authority over
intrastate activities that are regulated under a comprehensive
federal statutory scheme.
Even under the broad view of states' rights in Lopez and
Morrison, the ESA's comprehensive scheme is constitutional
under the Commerce Clause. The ESA does not intrude on
traditional state authority because the conservation of scarce
natural resources, including endangered and threatened species, has been a concurrent area of state and federal responsibility for many decades. 264 In 1920, the Supreme Court in Missouri v. Holland held that the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of
1918 did not infringe on state rights guaranteed by the Tenth
Amendment and that it did not divest states of their property
right in wild birds because the treaty and its implementing legislation took precedence over any conflicting power of regulation under the Supremacy Clause. 265 In 1979, the Supreme
Court in Hughes v. Oklahoma266 held that states do not "own"
the wildlife within their borders and that state laws regulating
wildlife are subordinate to congressional regulation under the
Commerce Clause. 267 The Hughes decision acknowledged that
states have an important role in regulating wildlife within
their borders, but held that the federal government has concurrent authority in conjunction with the states over any wildlife

263. See supra notes 183-228 and accompanying text.
264. See Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483,492,499-505 (4th Cir. 2000); MICHAEL
J. BEAN & MELANIE J. ROWLAND, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW
15-38 (3d ed. 1997) (discussing growth of federal regulation of wildlife and the
continuing state role); Mank, supra note 5, at 770-80; Mank, supra note 9, at 993,
999-100l.
265. 252 U.S. 416, 433-34 (1920) (discussing Migratory Bird Treaty Act, ch.
128, 40 Stat. 755 (1918) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712 (2000»);
Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, The Pioneer Spirit and the Public Trust: The
American Rule of Capture and State Ownership of Wildlife, 35 ENVTL. L. 673,
701-02 (2005).
266. 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
267. Id. at 329-35 (overruling Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896) (holding states own the wildlife in their borders»; Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 265, at
699-707 (discussing Supreme Court's gradual rejection of Geer doctrine that state
own wildlife culminating in its Hughes decision); Mank, supra note 5, at 774
(same).
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that affects interstate commerce. 268 In 1999, in Minnesota v.
Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians (Mille Lacs),269 the Court
upheld Chippewa Indian rights under an 1837 treaty that authorized the Chippewa to hunt, fish, and gather independent of
state regulation. 27o The Court concluded that the Native
American treaty rights were "reconcilable with state sovereignty over natural resources."271 The Mille Lacs decision
clearly stated that the federal government has concurrent powers with the states over wildlife. 272 Accordingly, Congress has
the authority to regulate all wildlife because "in areas of concurrent power, Congress has unlimited constitutional authority
to preempt the states-that is, legislatively to abolish constitutionally concurrent state lawmaking power and to convert concurrent federal power into exclusive power."273
For over 100 years, the federal government has played a
greater role than the states in preserving threatened or endangered species. 274 Due to public concerns about the impending
extinction of bison in the Western plains, Congress established
a national park system in 1894 by creating Yellowstone National Park, which "provided crucial habitat for the few remaining bison, preventing their complete extinction in the United
States."275 In 1900, Congress took its first statutory step to-

268. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 335-38; Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 499 (interpreting Hughes
as giving federal government" concurrent authority with states over wildlife);
Mank, supra note 5, at 774 (same) ; Mank, supra note 9, at 1000 (same); Lilly
Santaniello, Commerce Clause Challenges to the Endangered Species Act's Regulation of Intrastate Species on Private Land, 10 HAsTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. &
POL'y 39, 53 (2003); White, supra note 5, at 249 (same).
269. 526 U.S. 172 (1999).
270. Id. at 175-76, 208.
271. Id. at 205.
272. Id. at 204 ("Although States have important interests in regulating wildlife and natural resources within their borders, this authority is shared with the
Federal Government when the Federal Government exercises one of its enumerated constitutional powers ...."); Mank, supra note 5, at 775.
273. Gardbaum, supra note 81, at 797.
274. Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 500-01 (4th Cir. 2000) (explaining Congress's historical involvement in conservation); Mank, supra note 5, at 773-76
(arguing federal government has played leading role in protecting endangered
species); Mank, supra note 9, at 1000 (same); White, supra note 5, at 221-22
(same); Shannon Petersen, Comment, Congress and Charismatic Megafauna: A
Legislative History of the Endangered Species Act, 29 ENVTL. L. 463, 469 (1999)
(same).
275. SHANNON PETERSEN, ACTING FOR ENDANGERED SPECIES: THE STATUTORY
ARK 8 (2002); see also White, supra note 5, at 221 (same); Daniel J. Lowenberg,
Comment, The Texas Cave Bug and the California Arroyo Toad "Take" on the
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ward protecting threatened species with the Lacey Act,276
which originally forbade the interstate transport of animals
killed in violation of state law and now applies to all wild animals, including those bred in captivity, and to plants protected
by treaty or state law. 277 Lower federal courts addressing the
constitutionality of the Lacey Act, which does not preempt
state wildlife laws, have all upheld the law as a permissible exercise of the commerce power. 278 In 1918, after President
Woodrow Wilson signed a treaty with Canada to protect migratory birds, Congress enacted the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of
1918, which forbade the taking of many bird species and explicitly preempted inconsistent state laws. 279 In 1940, after the
Supreme Court had adopted a broader interpretation of the
Commerce Clause in Jones & Laughlin Steel, Congress invoked
its authority under the Commerce Clause to enact the Bald
Eagle Protection Act, which forbids taking, possessing, selling,
or exporting bald eagles or any of their parts. 280
States have not traditionally regulated or protected most
threatened or endangered species. 28I The failure of states to

Constitution's Commerce Clause, 36 ST. MARY'S L.J. 149, 161 (2004) (discussing
late nineteenth-century congressional debate about impending extinction of the
great plains bison).
276. Lacey Act, ch. 553, 31 Stat. 187 (1900) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 3371-3378 (2000»; see Mank, supra note 5, at 773-74 (discussing Lacey Act as
first step in process of creating national regime for protecting endangered species); Mank, supra note 9, at 933 (same); White, supra note 5, at 221 (same); Petersen, supra note 274, at 469 (same). The Lacey Act now applies to all wild animals, including those bred in captivity, and to plants protected by treaty or state
law. 16 U.S.C. § 3371 (discussing scope of the Act); see George Cameron Coggins &
Anne Fleishel Harris, The Greening of American Law: The Recent Evolution of
Federal Law for Preserving Floral Diversity, 27 NAT. RESOURCES J. 247, 305-07
(1987) (discussing 1981 Lacey Act Amendments).
277. See 16 U.S.C. § 3371 (discussing scope of the Act); Mank, supra note 9, at
933; Petersen, supra note 274, at 469.
278. PETERSEN, supra note 275, at 9; Lowenberg, supra note 275, at 161-62.
279. 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712; Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds,
U.S.-Gr. Brit., Aug. 16, 1916, 39 Stat. 1702; Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416,
435 (1920) (holding Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918 constitutional under the
Treaty Clause); Mank, supra note 9, at 934 (same); Petersen, supra note 274, at
469 (same). Great Britain signed the Treaty on behalf of Canada as overseer of
Canadian foreign affairs. Petersen, supra note 274, at 469 n.52.
280. See Bald Eagle Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 76-567, 54 Stat. 250 (1940)
(codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 668-668d (2000»; Mank, supra note 9, at 934; Petersen,
supra note 274, at 470.
281. Mank, supra note 5, at 776 (arguing states have not traditionally protected endangered species); Mank, supra note 9, at 1000 (same); White, supra note
5, at 250-52 (arguing state regulation of endangered species is inadequate and
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provide effective protection for these species and the advantages of uniform national legislation eventually resulted in
Congress's enactment of the ESA in 1973. 282 In the Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1966, Congress: (1) recognized that many states had failed to preserve these species; (2)
explicitly authorized the Department of Interior to continue its
practice of creating a list of endangered species; (3) created a
National Wildlife Refuge System to prohibit the taking of listed
endangered species living within federal lands; and (4) provided the government with authority to acquire additional federalland if necessary to accomplish preservation goals. However, the Act did not regulate private or state lands. 283 The
failure of the 1966 Act and the slightly broader Endangered
Species Conservation Act of 1969284 to stop extinctions led to
the far broader 1973 Act, which applies to all land in the
United States and adds protection for threatened species. 285
The ESA recognizes that states and the federal government have shared regulatory responsibilities in several ar-

federal government has greater expertise).
282. The ESA's legislative history stated that federal regulation of endangered
and threatened species was required to achieve uniform, national standards and
that inconsistent state laws likely hindered the protection of these species: "Protection of endangered species is not a matter that can be handled in absence of
coherent national and international policies[;] the results of a series of unconnected and disorganized polices and programs by various states might well be confusion compounded." H.R. REP. No. 93-412, at 7 (1973); see Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214
F.3d 483, 502 (4th Cir. 2000) ("A desire for uniform standards also spurred enactment of the ESA."); Mank, supra note 5, at 779 (arguing both the inadequacy of
state laws and desirability of national uniform regulation led Congress to enact
1973 ESA); Mank, supra note 9, at 1000-01 (same).
283. See Pub. L. No. 89-669, 80 Stat. 926 (1966); PETERSEN, supra note 275, at
471 (discussing the 1966 Act); Edward A. Fitzgerald, Seeing Red: Gibbs v. Babbitt,
13 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 29-30 (2002) (same); Mank, supra note 9, at 934-36
(same); Holly Doremus, Comment, Patching the Ark: Improving Legal Protection
of Biological Diversity, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 265, 295-96 (1991) (same); Davina Kari
Kaile, Note, Evolution of Wildlife Legislation in the United States: An Analysis of
the Legal Efforts to Protect Endangered Species and the Prospects for the Future, 5
GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 441, 448-54 (1993) (same).
284. See Pub. L. No. 91·135, § 2-3(a), 83 Stat. 275 (1969); PETERSEN, supra
note 275, at 472 (discussing 1969 Act); Fitzgerald, supra note 283, at 30 (same);
Mank, supra note 9, at 936 (same); Doremus, supra note 283, at 296-97 (same);
Kaile, supra note 283, at 451-53 (same).
285. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533, 1538(a)(I) (2000); Fitzgerald, supra note 283, at 31
(discussing 1973 Act); Mank, supra note 9, at 936-45 (same); Kaile, supra note
283, at 454-56 (same and noting 1973 Act expanded beyond 1966 and 1969 Acts
to include threatened species).
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eas. 286 The ESA requires the Secretary of Interior to consider
state efforts to preserve such species before any federal regulation may be imposed. 287 Also, the Act provides that the Secretary may enter into cooperative programs with states that have
adequate programs for conserving threatened and endangered
species and may provide financial assistance for such programs. 288 In Fiscal Year 2006, the federal government allocated $82 million for Section 6 cooperative programs. 289 Additionally, the ESA encourages the federal government to
cooperate with states in acquiring land for these species. 29o
Furthermore, the ESA is limited because the government
must review its listing decisions every five years to determine
if a species is still endangered or threatened. 291 Once a species
"recovers" (in other words, is no longer endangered or threatened), the federal government must return regulatory responsibility for the species to the states. 292 Thus, the ESA places
limits on national authority that are consistent with the Constitution's federalist structure and comport with Lopez and
Morrison, as well as with Justice Scalia's interpretation of the

286. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 502-05; Mank, supra note 5, at 780-81; see also Robert
Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources Law, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL.
L.J. 101, 133-38 (2006) (discussing ESA's provisions for cooperative federalism
and ways to improve them); Robert L. Fischman & Jaelith Hall Rivera, A Lesson
for Conservation from Pollution Control Law: Cooperative Federalism for Recovery
Under the Endangered Species Act, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 45, 80-89 (2002)
(same); Mank, supra note 9, at 940-41,998-1000 (same).
287. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(I)(A) (2000) (Secretary may list a species as endangered or threatened only after reviewing "those efforts, if any, being made by any
State ... to protect such species."); Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 503 (discussing 16 U.S.C.
§ 1533(b)(I)(A) (2000); Mank, supra note 9, at 999-1000; Mank, supra note 5, at
78l.
288. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1535(cHd) (2000); Mank, supra note 5, at 781; Mank, supra
note 9, at 1000.
289. Fischman, supra note 286, at 134.
290. 16 U.S.C. § 1535(a) (2000) (providing that the Secretary should acquire
land in cooperation with the states).
291. Id. § 1533(c)(2)(A)-(B) (requiring Secretary of Interior to revj.ew listed endangered or threatened species at least once every five years to determine if they
have recovered or require additional protection); Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 503; Mank,
supra note 5, at 780-81; Mank, supra note 9, at 940, 993, 999.
292. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3) (2000) (defining "conservation" as "the use of all
methods and procedures which are necessary to bring any endangered species or
threatened species to the point at which the measures provided pursuant to this
chapter are no longer necessary"); Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 503; Mank, supra note 5, at
780-81; Mank, supra note 9, at 940, 993, 999 (2004); Santaniello, supra note 268,
at 53.
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Necessary and Proper Clause as limited by that structure. 293
In SWANCC, the Court, in dicta, suggested that the government's attempt to regulate all wetlands, including isolated, intrastate wetlands, raised serious constitutional concerns under
the Commerce Clause, but the Court also stated that the government could regulate wetlands having a "significant nexus"
to navigable waters. 294 Thus, SWANCC suggested that limited
government regulation of the environment with a rational connection to interstate commerce is permissible. That is precisely
what the narrowly tailored ESA does by regulating only those
species at great risk whose extinction poses significant risks to
ecosystems, biodiversity, our genetic heritage, future medical
discoveries, agriculture, and ultimately the national economy,
as Part C, infra, will demonstrate. 295

C. Aggregation of All Endangered Species Is Necessary
and Proper
Whether Congress may regulate individual threatened or
endangered species that lack significant commercial value depends on whether courts (1) allow Congress to aggregate the
economic impact of all endangered species in measuring
whether they have a substantial impact on interstate commerce or (2) treat each species separately in determining such
impacts. If Congress may aggregate the economic impacts of
the takings of all endangered species, there undoubtedly would
be substantial impacts on interstate commerce because some
endangered species like the grizzly bear and bald eagle have
significant recreational value in generating tourism. 296 The
crux of the issue is whether it is necessary and proper for Congress to aggregate all endangered species. 297 If the ESA is a
293. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 503; Mank, supra note 5, at 780-81; Mank, supra note
9, at 940, 993, 999; Santaniello, supra note 268, at 53.
294. Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 167-74 (2001).
295. See supra notes 291-94 and accompanying text; infra notes 339-412 and
accompanying text.
296. GDF, 326 F.3d 622, 632, 639-40 (5th Cir. 2003), reh'g denied, 362 F.3d
286 (5th Cir. 2004) (en bane), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1114 (2005); id. at 641-44
(Dennis, J., concurring); Mank, supra note 9, at 942, 965-69, 971, 980, 988--91,
997-98; Mank, supra note 5, at 782-87,793-95; Nagle, supra note 5, at 184-86.
297. Compare Mank, supra note 5, at 782-87, 793-95 (discussing aggregation
principle under Commerce Clause and arguing that it is appropriate under Necessary and Proper Clause to aggregate different endangered species to demonstrate
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comprehensive regulatory scheme, then the fact that some species lack commercial value does not prevent Congress from
regulating them to achieve the Act's legitimate commercial
purposes. 298 Conversely, if it is inappropriate to aggregate different endangered species because each species has its own
unique impact on interstate commerce, then Congress would
have the authority to regulate and protect only those endangered species that possess significant commercial value. 299
In the statute, Congress stated that the ESA is necessary
to protect interstate commerce because "species of fish, wildlife,
and plants are of esthetic, ecological, educational, historical,
recreational, and scientific value to the Nation and its people."300 The ecological value of endangered species refers to the
role that animals and plants play in promoting air and water
quality, regulating the climate, removing unwanted pests, creating and protecting soil, controlling floods and droughts, pollinating crops, protecting the earth from ultraviolet rays, and
dispersing seeds and nutrients.3 01 Endangered plants and
animals are a present and future important source of drugs
and other medical treatments. 302 Additionally, ecotourism accounts for billions of dollars annually.303 Clearly, endangered
and threatened species in the aggregate have significant commercial value, but that leaves open the question of whether

substantial impacts on interstate commerce), and Mank, supra note 9, at 942,
965-69, 971, 980, 988-91, 997-98 (same), with Nagle, supra note 5, at 180, 193202 (discussing aggregation principle under Commerce Clause and arguing that it
is inappropriate under Necessary and Proper Clause to aggregate different endangered species to demonstrate substantial impacts on interstate commerce).
298. GDF, 326 F.3d at 639-40; id. at 641-44 (Dennis, J., concurring); Mank,
supra note 9, at 942, 965-69, 971, 980, 988-91, 997-98; Mank, supra note 5, at
782-87, 793-95; Nagle, supra note 5, at 200 (discussing argument that ESA is
valid under Necessary and Proper Clause).
299. See Nagle, supra note 5, at 180, 193-202 (discussing aggregation principle
under Commerce Clause and arguing that it is inappropriate to aggregate different endangered species to demonstrate substantial impacts on interstate commerce); see id. at 186-89 (questioning ecosystem and biodiversity arguments that
loss of even commercially insignificant endangered species is likely to have substantial adverse economic impacts and suggesting more proof of economic harm is
required to justify the ESA under the Commerce Clause). But see Mank, supra
note 5, at 782-87, 793-95 (discussing aggregation principle under Commerce
Clause and disagreeing with argument that it is inappropriate to aggregate different endangered species); Mank, supra note 9, at 988, 997 (same).
300. 16 U.s.C. § 1531(a)(3) (2000).
301. Nagle, supra note 5, at 184.
302. Id.
303. Id
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Congress has authority to protect species with little commercial
value.
Professor Nagle argues that Wickard does not support the
aggregation of all endangered species because, although it is
appropriate to aggregate a single commodity such as wheat, it
is inappropriate to aggregate different endangered species that
widely differ in their biological forms, their ecosystems, and
their economic value to interstate commerce. 304 In arguing
that it is inappropriate to aggregate different endangered species, he points out that the Wickard court aggregated "all
wheat grown by farmers for their personal use," but that the
court did not aggregate all the different crops grown by farmers
for their personal use. 305 Furthermore, he argues that the aggregation of wheat in Wickard was more justified under the
commerce power because the consumption of homegrown wheat
by a farmer directly and substantially affected interstate commerce; in contrast, the extinction of some endangered animals
with no commercial economic value would not impact commerce. 306 Accordingly, Professor Nagle suggests that it is inappropriate to aggregate all endangered species because many
such species lack any substantial connection to or impact on interstate commerce. 307 Additionally, he suggests that the Lopez
decision raises serious doubts about the appropriateness of aggregating noncommercial species with commercially valuable
species because the Court implied that it was usually inappropriate for Congress to broadly aggregate non-economic activities as a way to demonstrate that such activities nevertheless
had substantial impacts on interstate commerce. 308 Although
he acknowledges that courts have used a broad construction of
the Necessary and Proper Clause to authorize Congress to
regulate commercial activities that may include a few incidental activities without economic value, Professor Nagle argues
that it is inappropriate for courts to aggregate a large number
of commercially valueless species with commercially valuable

304. Id. at 193-95; Mank, supra note 5, at 784 (discussing and critiquing Professor Nagle's argument that it is inappropriate to aggregate all endangered species because they are too dissimilar); Mank, supra note 9, at 997 (same).
305. Nagle, supra note 5, at 194; Mank, supra note 5, at 784.
306. Nagle, supra note 5, at 195; Mank, supra note 5, at 784.
307. Nagle, supra note 5, at 197; Mank, supra note 5, at 784.
308. Nagle, supra note 5, at 197; Mank, supra note 5, at 785; Mank, supra note
9, at 997.
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ones. 309 He suggests that Congress may aggregate commercially valueless species with species that substantially affect
interstate commerce only if those species are substantially
similar in form, habitat, relationship, or some other significant
factor. 310
The subsequent Raich decision weakens Professor Nagle's
argument. If he wrote an article revisiting the subject in light
of Raich, Professor Nagle could argue that Raich does not undermine his argument because the case involved a single commodity, marijuana. Nevertheless, Raich calls into question at
least some of his argument because the Court and Justice
Scalia's concurring opinion upheld congressional regulation of a
noncommercial intrastate activity-medical marijuana use under state law-as part of a comprehensive statutory scheme. 311
Thus, the Court and Justice Scalia's concurring opinion authorized Congress, in at least some circumstances, to aggregate
noncommercial intrastate activities with commercially valuable
activities. In reviewing a comprehensive statutory scheme,
both the Raich Court and Justice Scalia's concurring opinion
implicitly placed the burden on the petitioners to explain why
it was impermissible for Congress to aggregate noncommercial
activities with commercially valuable activities. 312 If Congress
can aggregate intrastate medical marijuana with commercial
recreational use of the drug, then there is a rational basis for
aggregating intrastate species with interstate species, or noncommercial species with commercially valuable species, especially because these species are often part of complex, independent ecosystems. 313
The question of whether it is appropriate to aggregate all
endangered and threatened species depends upon Congress's
purpose for protecting them through the ESA.314 There are
309. Nagle, supra note 5, at 197-202 (discussing and quoting United States v.
Bolton, 68 F.3d 396, 399 (10th Cir. 1995) ("[I]f a statute regulates an activity
which, through repetition, in aggregate has a substantial affect [sic] on interstate
commerce ... 'the de minimis character of individual instances arising under the
statute is of no consequence."'»; see also Mank, supra note 5, at 785.
310. Nagle, supra note 5, at 193-202; Mank, supra note 5, at 784-85.
311. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2208-13 (2005); id., at 2216-19
(Scalia, J., concurring); supra notes 163, 167, 181, 201-02, 214-17 and accompanying text.
312. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2208-13; id. at 2215-20 (Scalia, J., concurring); supra
notes 164, 176-77, 181,226-28 and accompanying text.
313. See infra notes 344-45,361,367,371-72 and accompanying text.
314. Mank, supra note 5, at 785.
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four reasons that Congress might aggregate all threatened and
endangered species as part of a comprehensive statute that
better protects the commercial value of these species than a
more limited statute. First, Congress needed to provide uniform standards for protecting all threatened and endangered
species to prevent a race to the bottom by states that may be
tempted to lower their standards to promote economic development. 315 Second, Congress sought to preserve biodiversity by
protecting all threatened and endangered species because
many apparently obscure species are in fact essential to the
workings of their ecosystems. Furthermore, different species
often interact in such complex ways that the loss of apparently
"valueless" species may affect commercially valuable species. 316
There is significant evidence that the environment is more
valuable to interstate commerce if there are more species in the
ecosystem. 317 Third, there is a rational argument that Congress could consider the potential future economic value of all
endangered or threatened species in determining that it is necessary and proper to regulate all such species and not just
those that have substantial economic impacts today on interstate commerce. 318 Fourth, and most importantly, courts
should defer to legislative findings in the ESA that rely on the
uniformity, biodiversity, and future benefits arguments because each justification strengthens the case that the ESA is a
comprehensive scheme that depends upon protecting all
threatened and endangered species to maximize the total value
of these species to the national economy and to promote inter-

315. See infra notes 321-38 and accompanying text.
316. See GDF, 326 F.3d 622,640 (5th Cir. 2003) (arguing ESA aims to promote
biodiversity as a means to assist interstate commerce), reh'g denied, 362 F.3d 286
(5th Cir. 2004) (en banc), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1114 (2005); Rancho Viejo, LLC v.
Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (same), reh'g denied, 334 F.3d 1158
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1218 (U.S. 2004); Blumm & Kindrell, supra note 10, at 330-31, 353-54; Mank, supra note 5, at 785-87; Mank,
supra note 9, at 989-93,997-98; see infra notes 344-45, 361, 367, 371-72 and accompanying text.
317. See Blumm & Kindrell, supra note 10, at 330-31; Mank, supra note 5, at
785-87; Mank, supra note 9, at 989-93, 997-98; Nagle, supra note 5, at 188-89 &
n.59 (observing that the Delhi Sands flower-loving fly may have significant economic impacts on foods that are pollinated, such as "cashews, squash, mangos,
cardamom, cacao, cranberries, and highbush blueberries") (internal citations
omitted); see infra notes 355-57 accompanying text.
318. Mank, supra note 5, at 785, 787-92; see infra notes 377-90 and accompanying text.
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state commerce. 319 As part of the ESA's comprehensive
scheme, Congress has the authority to aggregate all threatened
and endangered species as necessary and proper to secure their
protection and protect their value in interstate commerce. 320
1.

National Uniform Regulation and Preventing a
Race to the Bottom

There is a strong argument that federal regulation of endangered and threatened species is necessary to prevent a
"race to the bottom" among states engaged in over-exploitation
of their resources to compete with other states. 321 For example,
states might loosen standards for developing land or harvesting
timber that could destroy critical habitat necessary for some
endangered and threatened species. 322 Furthermore, piecemeal state regulation is less likely to be effective than federal

319. See infra notes 391-412 and accompanying text.
320. Mank, supra note 5, at 785, 792-93; see infra notes 391-412 and accompanying text.
321. Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 501-02 (4th Cir. 2000); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Biodiversity and Land, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1,73-76 (1997) (arguing federal regulation is superior to state regulation of ecosystems because of incentives
for states to over exploit resources); Mank, supra note 5, at 777-80 (same); Maxwell L. Stearns, Crops, Guns & Commerce: A Game Theoretical Critique of Gonzales v. Raich 31-33 (Geo. Mason U. Sch. of Law Working Paper Series, Paper No.
37, 2005) (arguing game theory predicts states will under-protect endangered species compared to federal regulation), available at http://law.bepress.com/cgi/view
content.cgi?article=1036&context=gmulwps; Santaniello, supra note 268, at 53;
Van 'Loh, supra note 80, at 483; Woods, supra note 80, at 174-86 (presenting empirical evidence supporting "race-to-the-bottom" among states regulating surfacemining). But see Lowenberg, supra note 275, at 191-93 (arguing states and local
governments are capable of addressing environmental problems, including protecting threatened and endangered species).
322. Karkkainen, supra note 321, at 74-75.
Despite biodiversity's global benefits, many biodiversity-rich landowners,
communities, and states will calculate that they will be better off externalizing the costs of biodiversity by letting local land conversion and development proceed apace, while leaving the costs of conservation to others. Indeed, states and communities with the largest inventories of
undisturbed habitat and ecosystems are probably the least inclined to
protect them for two reasons. First, from a local perspective, these lands
may appear to be an overabundant resource. Second, these localities may
be reluctant to protect these resources because they would carry a disproportionate share of the localized costs of conservation if they must
forego development on a disproportionate percentage of their lands.
Jd.; Van Loh, supra note 80, at 483.
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regulation. 323 The House of Representatives Report on the
1973 ESA specifically justified the statute as necessary because
state efforts had been and were likely to continue to be ineffective, stating, "protection of endangered species is not a matter
that can be handled in the absence of coherent national and international policies: the results of a series of unconnected and
disorganized policies and programs by various states might
well be confusion compounded."324 Additionally, in Gibbs u.
Babbitt,325 the Fourth Circuit concluded that the uniform standards of the ESA enhance interstate commerce by avoiding conflicting state standards. 326
In Hodel u. Virginia Surface Mining,327 the Court approved
federal regulation of intrastate mining activities under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA) because the absence of federal legislation would likely lead to ruinous competition among states, lowering each state's
environmental standards in order to retain or attract businesses from other states.3 28 In approving federal regulation of
intrastate mining operations, the Court stated, "The prevention
of this sort of destructive interstate competition is a traditional
role for congressional action under the Commerce Clause."329
Some commentators suggest that the framers of the Constitution would have approved of congressional legislation-based
on the Commerce Clause-designed to prevent harmful national competition that states are unable to regulate effectively.330 In National Ass'n of Home Builders u. Babbitt
(NAHB),331 Judge Wald argued that Hodel u. Virginia Surface

323. See Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 501-02; Mank, supra note 5, at 777-80; Stearns,
supra note 321, at 31-33; Van Loh, supra note 80, at 483.
324. See H.R. REP. No. 93-412 , at 7 (1973); Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 502; Mank, suo
pra note 5, at 779.
325. 214 F.3d 483.
326. Id. at 502; Mank, supra note 5, at 779.
327. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
328. Id. at 281-82 (observing congressional concern that such competition
among states would prevent "adequate standards on coal mining operations
within their borders."); Mank, supra note 5, at 777; Mank supra note 9, at 947;
Woods, supra note 80, at 174-86 (presenting empirical evidence supporting "race·
to-the-bottom" among states regulating surface-mining).
329. Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining, 452 U.S. at 282.
330. See Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a
''Race'' and Is It "To the Bottom"?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 281-82 (1997); Mank,
supra note 5, at 778.
331. 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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Mining's rationale that Congress has authority under the
Commerce Clause to regulate intrastate activities to prevent
destructive interstate competition was a persuasive ground for
justifying congressional regulation of endangered species under
the ESA.332 Because a number of states do not possess effective regulatory schemes to protect endangered species, the Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining decision supports an interpretation of the Commerce Clause that Congress may protect
intrastate endangered species lacking significant value in interstate commerce to prevent significant under-regulation of
these species by the states. 333
Although it does not specifically address the issue of destructive interstate competition that was the focus of SMCRA,
the ESA's legislative history does indicate that Congress
wanted uniform federal standards because different state standards would likely lead to ineffective protection of endangered
species. 334 Most of the benefits of biodiversity are national in
scope rather than local, including the value of drugs derived
from plants and animals, agricultural products, and the insurance value that healthy ecosystems provide against the possibility of catastrophic natural disasters. 335 Uniform federal
standards under the ESA likely protect endangered or threat-

332. The parallels between Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and the case at
hand are obvious. The ESA and the Surface Mining Act both regulate activitiesdestruction of endangered species and destruction of the natural landscape-that
are carried out entirely within a State and which are not themselves commercial
in character. The activities, however, may be regulated because they have destructive effects, on environmental quality in one case and on the availability of a
variety of species in the other, that are likely to affect more than one State. In
each case, moreover, interstate competition provides incentives to states to adopt
lower standards to gain an advantage vis-a-vis other states: in Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining the states were motivated to adopt lower environmental standards to improve the competitiveness of their coal production facilities, and in this
case, the states are motivated to adopt lower standards of endangered species protection in order to attract development. [d. at 1055 (citations and footnote omitted); Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 10, at 328 n.122, 354; Mank, supra note 5, at
777-78; Mank, supra note 9, at 947-48; Santaniello, supra note 268, at 48.
333. See Mank, supra note 5, at 777-81; Mank, supra note 9, at 1001; Santaniello, supra note 268, at 53; supra notes 321-32 and accompanying text.
334. See H.R. REP. No. 93-412, at 7 (1973)("[Pjrotection of endangered species
is not a matter that can be handled in [thej absence of coherent national and international policies: the results of a series of unconnected and disorganized policies and programs by various states might well be confusion compounded."); Gibbs
v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 501-02 (4th Cir. 2000) (stating "[aj desire for uniform
standards also spurred enactment of the ESA."); Mank, supra note 5, at 779.
335. Karkkainen, supra note 321, at 73-74.
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ened species far more effectively than state regulation, both because of the advantages of federal uniformity and because
many states lack adequate programs for biodiversity and habitat protection. 336 Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit in Gibbs determined that the ESA's uniform standards facilitate interstate
commerce by preempting conflicting state standards. 337 Additionally, in the absence of the ESA, there is a significant risk
that at least some states would race to the bottom to exploit
timber or develop land and would destroy critical habitat currently protected by the ESA leading to the extinction of some
valuable endangered or threatened species. 338 For all of these
reasons, the Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining precedent supports Congress's authority to regulate endangered or threatened species in order to prevent the harms to the environment
and nature that would occur in the absence of comprehensive
federal legislation.
2.

Protecting Biodiversity

The ESA's legislative history emphasized the importance
of protecting endangered or threatened species as a means to
preserve biodiversity, which refers to ecosystems containing a
wide range and sufficient number of often interdependent species that enhance the overall health of the ecosystem. 339 In
NAHB, Judge Wald argued that the ESA's policy of protecting
biodiversity provides substantial benefits to interstate com-

336. See Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 10, at 336 (reporting Gibbs's court
conclusion that eliminating federal regulation of endangered species would
weaken their protection); Mank, supra note 9, at 779-80 (arguing federal government has greater expertise than states in environmental protection and wildlife
conservation); Karkkainen, supra note 321, at 73-76 (arguing federal regulation
is superior to state regulation of ecosystems because of incentives for states to
over exploit resources); White, supra note 5, at 250-52 (same).
337. 214 F.3d at 502; Mank, supra note 5, at 779.
338. Van Loh, supra note 80, at 483; see also Woods, supra note 80, at 174-86
(presenting empirical evidence supporting "race-to-the-bottom" among states
regulating surface-mining, but acknowledging other areas of environmental regulation may not lead to such a race).
339. H.R. REP. No. 93-412, at 4-5 (1973) (stressing importance of preserving
our "genetic heritage"); See NAHB, 130 F.3d 1041, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("[O]ne of
the primary reasons that Congress sought to protect endangered species from
'takings' was the importance of [the] continuing availability of a wide variety of
species to interstate commerce."); Mank, supra note 5, at 729, 786-87 (discussing
legislative findings in 1973 ESA justifying preservation of biodiversity and species' genetic material); Van Loh, supra note 80, at 484-85 (same).
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merce by preserving a large number and wide range of different animal and plant species. 34o Current scientific data supported congressional findings in the ESA's 1973 legislative history that "'taking[s]' [of endangered species] ... would have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce by depriving commercial actors of access to an important natural resourcebiodiversity."341
There is a strong biodiversity argument for preserving
commercially insignificant endangered species that may affect
other species and entire ecosystems that do have significant
impacts on interstate commerce. In NAHB, Judge Henderson
concurred because she did not agree with Judge Wald's argument that potential future medicinal or economic benefits from
preserving biodiversity loss justified Commerce Clause regulation; in her view, these potential future impacts were too uncertain. 342 Instead, Judge Henderson argued that Congress
had the authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate an
obscure endangered Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly that only
lived in a small area in California and had no apparent economic value because "the loss of biodiversity itself has a substantial effect on our ecosystem and likewise on interstate commerce."343 She claimed that because of "the interconnectedness
of species and ecosystems, it is reasonable to conclude that the
extinction of one species affects others and their ecosystems
and that the protection of a purely intrastate species ... will
therefore substantially affect land and objects that are involved
in interstate commerce."344 Thus, she contended that the ESA
may reach commercially insignificant species because there is a

340. 130 F.3d at 1052-53 (Wald, J., plurality opinion); Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 10, at 329-30; Mank, supra note 9, at 986.
341. NAHB,130 F.3d at 1053-54 (Wald, J., plurality opinion); Blumm & Kim·
brell, supra note 10, at 329-31; Mank, supra note 9, at 986.
342. NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1057-58 (Henderson, J., concurring); Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 10, at 330-31; Mank, supra note 5, at 758; Santaniello, supra
note 268, at 48-49.
343. NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1058-59 (Henderson, J., concurring); Mank, supra
note 5, at 758, 786. Judge Henderson concurred because she did not agree with
Judge Wald's argument that potential future medicinal or economic benefits from
preserving biodiversity loss justified Commerce Clause regulation; Judge Henderson argued these potential future impacts were too uncertain. NAHB, 130 F.3d at
1058 (Henderson, J., concurring); Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 10, at 330-31;
Mank, supra note 5, at 758-59, 786.
344. NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1059 (Henderson, J., concurring); Blumm & Kimbrell,
supra note 10, at 330-31; Mank, supra note 5, at 758-59, 786.
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rational basis for Congress's assumption in the statute that
their extinction could harm more commercially valuable species
and, therefore, that their extinction could substantially affect
interstate commerce. 345 Judge Henderson, however, failed to
provide any specific evidence regarding how the extinction of
the fly might affect other species or substantially affect interstate commerce. 346
Although Professor Nagle argues that the biodiversity arguments for aggregation suggested by Judge Wald and Judge
Henderson go too far because their reasoning would justify an
"Earth Preservation Act" forbidding harm to any natural objects of the earth,347 he fails to address adequately the more
limited nature of the ESA. The ESA is restricted to protecting
only those species that are threatened and endangered rather
than all species. 348 Furthermore, the ESA returns control of
species to states as soon as the species has recovered and is no
longer threatened or endangered. 349
The ESA complies with even the narrow approach to federalism of Lopez and Morrison because the statute contains an
appropriate "limiting principle" as it applies to species only so
long as they are threatened or endangered. In GDF, the Fifth
Circuit concluded that interpreting the Commerce Clause to
authorize Congress to regulate all threatened and endangered
species does not interfere with a traditional area of state regulation because regulation of endangered species is a shared
subject of national interest. 35o Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit
concluded that the ESA's limited regulation of only endangered
345. NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1059 (Henderson, J., concurring) (citing Lopez, 514
U.S. at 549, 557-59); Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 10, at 330-31; Mank, supra
note 5, at 759, 786.
346. See NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1065 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (arguing Judge
Henderson's biodiversity and ecosystem protection arguments for validity of regulating fly failed to meet Supreme Court's requirement in Lopez that regulation
must substantially affect commercial concerns); Mank, supra note 5, at 759-60;
but see Nagle, supra note 5, at 188--89 & n.59 (observing that Delhi Sands flowerloving fly may have significant economic impacts on foods that are pollinated,
such as "cashews, squash, mangos, cardamon, cacao, cranberries, and highbush
blueberries").
347. Nagle, supra note 5, at 198--99; Mank, supra note 5, at 787.
348. See Mank, supra note 5, at 787; supra notes 253-54, 282, 285, 291-92 and
accompanying text; infra notes 351-53 and accompanying text.
349. See Mank, supra note 5, at 787; supra notes 291-93 and accompanying
text.
350. 326 F.3d 622, 639-40 (5th Cir. 2003); Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 10,
at 336, 340, 344-45, 353; Mank, supra note 9, at 989-90.
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or threatened species, as opposed to all other species, comports
with the statement in Lopez and Morrison that congressional
legislation is more likely to be valid under the Commerce
Clause if a statute has a limiting principle. 351 The GDF court
determined that an appropriate limiting principle existed because the statute is limited to endangered species that would
likely be affected by a small number of takes, and does not apply to abundant species.3 52 Because of the ESA's limitation of
its authority to only threatened and endangered species and its
requirement that "recovered" species must return to state regulation, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the ESA "will not allow
Congress to regulate general land use or wildlife preservation."353
The ESA's policy of preserving biodiversity meets the
Court's substantial-effects-on -interstate-commerce standard for
the Commerce Clause because the ESA produces significant
current economic benefits to interstate commerce. 354 Because
preserving genetic diversity may lessen the spread of diseases,
protect food sources, and provide medicines, the ESA's policy of
preserving biodiversity by protecting all threatened and endangered species-not just those that have direct commercial
value-is a rational policy that sufficiently promotes the economic value of interstate commerce to be constitutional under
the Commerce Clause. 355 For example, there is some scientific
evidence that more biologically diverse ecosystems and wildlife
populations are less prone to catastrophic diseases or pests. 356
Accordingly, preserving the diversity of plants and animals is
351. GDF, 326 F.3d at 639-40 (discussing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598,612-13 (2000»; Mank, supra note 9, at 990.
352. 326 F.3d at 639-40 (discussing Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612-13); Mank, supra note 9, at 990.
353. GDF, 326 F.3d at 640 (discussing Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612-13 (quoting
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995» ('We rejected these ... arguments because they would permit Congress to 'regulate not only all violent crime,
but all activities that might lead to violent crime .... "'», reh'g denied, 362 F.3d
286 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1114 (2005); Mank, supra note
9, at 989-90, 998-99.
354. See Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 10, at 330-31; Coggins & Harris, supra note 276, at 253-57; Mank, supra note 5, at 788.
355. See Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 10, at 330-31; Coggins & Harris, supra note 276, at 253-57; Mank, supra note 5, at 788. But see Lowenberg, supra
note 275, at 185 (arguing only small percentage of species have useful genetic
compounds).
356. Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 10, at 330-31; Coggins & Harris, supra
note 276, at 253-57; Mank, supra note 5, at 788.
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advantageous for securing reliable sources of food for human
beings because over-reliance on a few crops makes them more
vulnerable to disease or pests. 357
Furthermore, plants and animals are sources of chemicals
and raw materials for many commercial products. 358 For instance, about half of all the drugs used in medicine are derived
from plants or animals, including several endangered species,
with a total value of billions of dollars every year. 359 Furthermore, many species that lack individual commercial value perform important "ecosystem services" by decomposing organic
matter, renewing soil, mitigating floods, purifying air or water,
or limiting destructive climatic variation. 36o In many instances, the loss of endangered species that have little direct
commercial value in interstate commerce would adversely impact other species, both endangered and abundant, that have
significant commercial value. Thus, the extinction of many
commercially valueless endangered species would have a substantial impact on interstate commerce. 361 In Gibbs, the

357. Coggins & Harris, supra note 276, at 253-55 (discussing crop composition
of human diets); Mank, supra note 5, at 788; Nagle, supra note 5, at 185 (stating
American farmers use genes from wild plant species in producing nearly $1 billion
of crops).
358. NAHB, 130 F.3d 1041, 1052-53 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Wald, J., plurality opinion) (observing that plant genetic resources contributed to the "explosive growth
in farm production" during the twentieth century); EDWARD O. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE 281-310 (W.W. Norton 1999) (1992) (discussing medical and
commercial value of several species, including endangered Zea diploperennis, a
relative of corn with possible agricultural value; and Catharanthus roseus, rosy
periwinkle, used to treat cancer); Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 10, at 330-31 &
n.128; Coggins & Harris, supra note 276, at 256-57 (providing examples of plants
used in business and industry); Mank, supra note 5, at 788; McKibbin, supra note
256, at 24-25 (,'The biodiversity literature abounds with examples of near-extinct
species found, in the nick of time, to have useful pharmaceutical and agricultural
properties.").
359. NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1052-53 (Wald, J., plurality opinion) (observing that
50% of the most frequently prescribed medicines are derived from wild plant and
animal species; those medicines had a 1983 value in excess of $15 billion a year);
Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 10, at 330-31 & n.128; Coggins & Harris, supra
note 276, at 255-56 (discussing role of plants in medicine); John Charles Kunich,
Preserving the Womb of the Unknown Species with Hotspots Legislation, 52 HAsTINGS L.J. 1149, 1163-64 (2001) (stating total value of drugs derived from wild organisms is $14 billion per year); Mank, supra note 5, at 788; Nagle, supra note 5,
at 185 (noting plants are being studied to find cure for AIDS); White, supra note
5, at 243-47 (discussing use of plants as sources of chemotherapy drugs).
360. Kunich, supra note 359, at 1164-65; Mank, supra note 9, at 989; Mank,
supra note 5, at 786.
361. See Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 10, at 330-31; Kunich, supra note 358,
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Fourth Circuit concluded that "it is simply not beyond the
power of Congress to conclude that a healthy environment actually boosts industry by allowing commercial development of
our national resources."362
Because the ESA's policy of preserving as many endangered and threatened species as possible substantially affects
interstate commerce by promoting biodiversity, courts should
conclude that the ESA's aggregation of all endangered and
threatened species is a necessary and proper means of the congressional commerce power.363 In TVA v. Hill,364 the Supreme
Court recognized the congressional goal of using the ESA to
protect ecosystems when it stated that in enacting the ESA in
1973, "Congress was concerned [not only] about the unknown
uses that endangered species might have[, but also] ... about
the unforeseeable place such creatures may have in the chain of
life on this planet."365 In Gibbs, the Fourth Circuit concluded
that "Congress is entitled to make the judgment that conservation is potentially valuable, even if that value cannot be presently ascertained."366 Because commercially insignificant species often have important effects on commercially valuable
species and ecosystems, the Fifth Circuit agreed that, despite
the absence of an express jurisdictional element in the statute,
"the ESA's take provision is limited to instances which 'have an
explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce."'367
In Rancho Viejo, the District of Columbia Circuit held that
Congress could justify the ESA in part on the non-economic
goal of preserving biodiversity because the Commerce Clause
authorizes statutes to have multiple purposes as long as economic regulation is a significant component of the legislation.
It also held that Congress could regulate large commercial development with significant impacts on interstate commerce

at 1164-65 (discussing numerous benefits both apparent and less visible created
by living species); Mank, supra note 5, at 786.
362. Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 496 (4th Cir. 2000).
363. Mank, supra note 5, at 786-87; see also Kunich, supra note 358, at 116465 (discussing ecosystem benefits created by having wide variety of living species).
364. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
365. Id. at 178-79 (emphasis in original); accord Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 496; Mank,
supra note 9, at 997; Mank, supra note 5, at 789-90.
366. 214 F.3d at 496; Mank, supra note 5, at 789-90.
367. GDF, 326 F.3d at 640 (emphasis in original) (quoting United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611-12 (2000»; Mank, supra note 9, at 997.
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that would destroy the critical habitat of threatened or endangered species. 368
In his concurring opinion in GDF, Judge Dennis relied on
the Necessary and Proper Clause in arguing that the ESA's
regulation of commercially insignificant species was constitutional under the Commerce Clause because the Supreme Court
had recognized since the Darby decision in 1941 that ''both
commercial and noncommercial activity may be regulated by
Congress if the regulation is an essential or integral part of a
larger comprehensive scheme properly regulating activity substantially affecting interstate commerce."369 He argued that
Congress has the authority under the Commerce Clause to protect noncommercial, intrastate endangered species as an essential means of protecting commercially valuable ecosystems and
species that have a substantial impact on interstate commerce. 370 Although there are legitimate questions about
whether all endangered or threatened species are in fact essential for preserving commercially valuable species or ecosystems,
Judge Dennis argued that courts should defer to the ESA's
comprehensive statutory scheme because "[t]he interrelationship of commercial and noncommercial species is so complicated, intertwined, and not yet fully understood that Congress
acted rationally in seeking to protect all endangered or threatened species from extinction or harm."371 Recognizing these
complex interrelationships, he concluded that it is appropriate
for Congress, in the ESA, to aggregate the impact of all takes of
368. 323 F.3d 1062, 1073-76 (D.C. Cir. 2003), reh'g denied, 334 F.3d 1158 (D.C.
Cir. 2003) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1218 (2004); Mank, supra note 9, at
976-77.
369. GDF, 326 F.3d at 642-43 (Dennis, J., concurring); Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 10, at 341; Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 14, at 496 (arguing Judge
Dennis' concurrence in GDF "emphasized that the Necessary and Proper Clause
supported the ESA's constitutionality as a comprehensive scheme, of which the
regulation of species takes is an essential part."); Mank, supra note 9, at 990.
370. GDF, 326 F.3d at 641 (Dennis, J., concurring); Mank, supra note 9, at
990-91.
371. GDF, 326 F.3d at 643-44 (Dennis, J., concurring); Mank, supra note 9, at
991. Given the limitations of scientific knowledge, it is unrealistic for a court to
try to determine if a specific species has significant value to an ecosystem and, in
turn, to interstate commerce. See generally Jamie Murphy, The Quiet Apocalypse,
TIME, Oct. 13, 1986, at 80 (quoting Edward O. Wilson: "[W]e don't know for sure
how many species there are, where they can be found or how fast they're disappearing. It's like having astronomy without knowing where the stars are."); WIL·
SON, supra note 358, at 308 (stating that science cannot provide reliable estimates
of the value of species).

450

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO lAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78

endangered species because "the regulation is necessary and
proper to ... the ESA's comprehensive scheme to preserve the
nation's genetic heritage and the 'incalculable' value inherent
to that scarce natural resource, and because that regulatory
scheme has a very substantial impact on interstate commerce."372 Judge Dennis made the strongest case that there
was a rational basis for Congress to protect all endangered or
threatened species for biodiversity benefits when he emphasized that preserving biodiversity was a central part of the
ESA's comprehensive scheme of protection and that Congress
had authority to preserve biodiversity under both the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause. 373 The
Gibbs, Rancho Viejo, and GDF decisions, as well as Judge
Wald's opinion in NAHB and Judge Henderson's concurring
opinion in NAHB, made strong arguments in favor of a biodiversity justification for the ESA's protection of all endangered
or threatened species under the Commerce Clause.
The Raich opinion's deferential approach for reviewing
congressional findings provides a strong rationale for concluding that courts should defer to the congressional findings in the
ESA about the need to preserve endangered and threatened
species as a way to preserve biodiversity and sensitive ecosystems.3 74 Under Raich's deferential standard for reviewing congressional findings of fact, Congress in the 1973 ESA more
than adequately justified the statute as a means of preserving
the benefits of biodiversity even if science still does not fully
understand all of these benefits.375

372. GDF, 326 F.3d at 644 (Dennis, J., concurring) (quoting Charles Tiefer, After Morrison, Can Congress Preserve Environmental Laws from Commerce Clause
Challenge?, 30 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,888 (Sept. 2000»; Mank, supra
note 9, at 99l.
373. See GDF, 326 F.3d at 642-43 (Dennis, J., concurring); Blumm & Kimbrell,
supra note 14, at 496 (arguing Judge Dennis' concurrence in GDF "emphasized
that the Necessary and Proper Clause supported the ESA's constitutionality as a
comprehensive scheme, of which the regulation of species takes is an essential
part."); Mank, supra note 9, at 990; supra notes 369-72 and accompanying text.
374. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2201-15 (2005); id. at 2219-20 (Scalia,
J., concurring); supra notes 158, 175-76, 181, 187, 226-28 and accompanying text.
375. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2208 ("[wle have never required Congress to make
particularized findings in order to legislate absent a special concern such as the
protection of free speech." (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562
(1995»).
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Future Economic Benefits

There is a strong argument that courts should defer to
Congress's rational argument that it is appropriate to preserve
all endangered or threatened species because it is impossible to
know which species may have important economic or social
benefits in the future. Congress may consider the potential future economic value of endangered and threatened species in
determining that it is necessary and proper to regulate all such
species and not just those that have substantial economic impacts on interstate commerce today. In the 1973 ESA's legislative history, Congress emphasized the potential future economic and medical benefits of preserving a wide variety of
species and genetic heritage. 376 The House Report explained
that it was essential to preserve endangered species because
the value of their "genetic heritage is, quite literally, incalculable":
Who knows, or can say, what potential cures for cancer or
other scourges, present or future, may lie locked up in the
structures of plants which may yet be undiscovered, much
less analyzed? More to the point, who is prepared to risk being [sic] those potential cures by eliminating those plants
for all time? Sheer self-interest impels us to be cautious. 377

376. Mank, supra note 9, at 938-39; Mank, supra note 5, at 729-30; infra notes
377-84, 387-90 and accompanying text.
377. H.R. REP. No. 93-412, at 4-5 (1973). Similarly, the Senate Report on the
1969 ESA noted:
From a pragmatic point of view, the protection of an endangered species
of wildlife with some commercial value may permit the regeneration of
that species to a level where controlled exploitation of that species can be
resumed. In such a case businessmen may profit from the trading and
marketing of that species for an indefinite number of years, where otherwise it would have been completely eliminated from commercial channels in a very brief span of time. Potentially more important, however, is
the fact that with each species we eliminate, we reduce the [genetic] pool
... available for use by man in future years. Since each living species
and subspecies has developed in a unique way to adapt itself to the difficulty of living in the world's environment, as a species is lost, its distinctive gene material, which may subsequently prove invaluable to mankind in improving domestic animals or increasing resistance to disease
or environmental contaminants, is also irretrievably lost.
S. REP. No. 91-526, at 3 (1969), as reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1415.
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The Fourth Circuit in Gibbs and Judge Wald of the District
of Columbia Circuit in NAHB have stated that courts should
defer to these congressional findings about the future value of
endangered species, even if those benefits could not be precisely calculated. 378 The Fourth Circuit stated that the Supreme Court has traditionally deferred to congressional findings that regulation may produce economic or other benefits in
the future as long as there is a rational basis for such legislative findings. 379 Thus, the Fourth Circuit concluded that Congress has authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate an
endangered or threatened species because the species could
have a substantial economic impact on interstate commerce in
the future, even if that species has no current impact on interstate commerce. 380
Judge Wald argued that it was appropriate to aggregate
together all endangered species in assessing their economic
impact on interstate commerce because the ESA produces significant current and future economic benefits to interstate
commerce by preserving genetic diversity and conserving genetic resources that may have future medical value. 381 She
contended that each time a species becomes extinct and the
pool of wild species decreases, the extinction "has a substantial
effect on interstate commerce by diminishing a natural resource that could otherwise be used for present and future
commercial purposes."382 She acknowledged that the full value
of many plants and animals is uncertain but nonetheless concluded that each endangered species is entitled to protection
because "[a] species whose worth is still unmeasured has what
economists call an 'option value'-the value of the possibility
that a future discovery will make useful a species that is cur378. Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 496-98 (4th Cir. 2000) (discussing 1973
ESA's legislative history's focus on future economic and medical benefits and ar·
guing that concern for future economic benefits was appropriate basis for congressional regulation under Commerce Clause); NAHB, 130 F.3d 1041, 1050-54 (D.C.
Cir. 1997) (Wald, J., plurality opinion) (same); Mank, supra note 5, at 729-30,
756-57, 766, 782-92 (arguing legislative concern for future economic benefits in
1973 ESA's legislative history was appropriate basis for national regulation under
Commerce Clause); Mank, supra note 9, at 938-39, 967 (same).
379. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 496-97; Mank, supra note 5, at 766.
380. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 496; Mank, supra note 5, at 766.
381. NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1052-53 (Wald, J., plurality opinion); Mank, supra
note 5, at 756-57; Mank, supra note 9, at 967.
382. NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1053 (Wald, J., plurality opinion); Mank, supra note 5,
at 756; Mank, supra note 9, at 967.

2007]

AFTER RAJCH: IS THE ESA CONSTITUTIONAL?

453

rently thought of as useless."383 She argued that "[t]o allow
even a single species whose value is not currently apparent to
become extinct therefore deprives the economy of the option
value of that species."384 Conversely, the Fifth Circuit and
other judges on the District of Columbia Circuit have criticized
the potential future uses rationale for justifying congressional
regulation under the Commerce Clause because that methodology would allow Congress to regulate any endangered species
no matter how attenuated its relationship to interstate commerce or how speculative its future value to society.385
Following the Raich Court's deferential approach to congressional findings, courts should defer to Congress's rational
finding that all endangered and threatened species should be
preserved because of their potentially irreplaceable future
benefits that society could otherwise lose forever. In Raich, the
Court deferred to congressional findings that regulating intrastate markets in marijuana was an essential component in
regulating the national market in the drug, but the Court also
stated that the absence of particular congressional findings regarding medical marijuana use did not "call into question Congress's authority to legislate."386 Accordingly under Raich, the
ESA's general findings about the importance of preserving bio-

383. NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1053 (Wald, J., plurality opinion); Mank, supra note 5,
at 756-57; Mank, supra note 9, at 967. In one study, two scholars estimated that
the option value, or economic value of biodiversity, for the entire world was between $16 and $54 trillion per year, with an average value of $33 trillion, which is
roughly double the annual global national product. KERRY TEN KATE & SARAH A.
LAIRD, THE COMMERCIAL USE OF BIODIVERSITY: ACCESS TO GENETIC RESOURCES
AND BENEFIT SHARING 3 (1999).
384. NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1053 (Wald, J., plurality opinion); Mank, supra note 5,
at 757; Mank, supra note 9, at 967.
385. GDF, 326 F.3d 622, 637-38 (5th Cir. 2003) ("The possibility of future sub·
stantial effects of the Cave Species on interstate commerce, through industries
such as medicine, is simply too hypothetical and attenuated from the regulation in
question to pass constitutional muster." (citing United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598, 612 (2000»; NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1057-58 (Henderson, J., concurring)
(criticizing Judge Wald's aggregation of all endangered species on biodiversity and
future medical uses grounds because value of many species is too speculative); id.
at 1065 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (same); Akins, supra note 27, at 181 (criticizing
Judge Wald's aggregation of all endangered species because the "connection between the regulated activity and interstate commerce is too attenuated"); Nagle,
supra note 5, at 183-84 (same); see also Mank, supra note 5, at 757 (discussing
criticism of using potential future value of all endangered species to justify congressional regulation under the Commerce Clause); Mank, supra note 9, at 967,
988 (same).
386. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2208 (2005).
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diversity and preserving our genetic heritage for future generations are sufficient even though Congress did not make particularized findings about the value of specific species. Because
some commercially insignificant species likely will have value
in the future, it was rational for Congress to protect all endangered and threatened species. 387 There is a good argument
that it is safer to preserve as many species as possible because
one can never be sure whether a species could be useful in the
future. 388 The loss of any endangered species, even if it has no
value today, arguably poses significant future economic harm
to interstate commerce for future generations by reducing biodiversity and eliminating genetic material that could provide
valuable medical and other benefits.389 Despite the uncertain
value of species in the future, following Raich's deferential approach to generalized congressional findings, courts should defer to Congress's reasonable judgment that society and interstate commerce will be better off in the future under the ESA's
policy of protecting all endangered and threatened species instead of only those that have current economic value. 39o Even
if courts reject this argument, the future benefits argument is
not essential because the other three arguments-(l) preventing a race to the bottom among states; (2) preserving biodiversity and ecosystems; and (3) deferring to Congress's comprehensive scheme for preserving endangered and threatened
species due to their present benefits to interstate commerceare more than sufficient to sustain the constitutionality of the
ESA as a necessary and proper exercise of the commerce power.

387. Mank, supra note 5, at 758, 760, 789, 795 (conceding future benefits of endangered species is somewhat speculative).
388. The traditional econometric approach, weighing market price and tourist
dollars, will always underestimate the true value of wild species. None has been
totally assayed for all of the commercial profit, scientific knowledge, and aesthetic
pleasure it can yield. Furthermore, none exists in the wild all by itself. Every species is part of an ecosystem, an expert specialist of its kind, tested relentlessly as
it spreads its influence through the food web. To remove it is to entrain changes in
other species, raising the population of some, reducing or even extinguishing others, risking a downward spiral of the larger assemblage. WILSON, supra note 358,
at 308; see Kunich, supra note 359, at 1166 (arguing that it is impossible to predict for certain which species will be valuable in future); Mank, supra note 5, at
788-89 (same); White, supra note 5, at 246 (same).
389. Mank, supra note 5, at 788-89.
390. Mank, supra note 5, at 791-95.
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Deference to Congress's Comprehensive Scheme
under a Rational Basis Standard

Since its 1937 decision in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp.,391 the Supreme Court has used a rational basis standard
of review in deciding whether Congress has authority under
the Commerce Clause to regulate specific activities. 392 In Morrison, the Court stated that there is a presumption that a statute enacted pursuant to the commerce power is constitutional. 393 Citing Lopez, the Raich Court explained that under
the rational basis standard of review, in cases involving the
constitutionality of a statute under the Commerce Clause, the
Court "need not determine whether respondents' activities,
taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only whether a 'rational basis' exists for so
concluding."394 Both the Raich decision and Justice Scalia's
concurrence recognized that the Court applies the rational basis standard to the statute and the activities it regulates in the
aggregate rather than to incidental, intrastate activities that
fall within its scope.3 95 In reviewing a comprehensive statutory
scheme, both the Raich Court and Justice Scalia's concurring
opinion placed the burden on the petitioners to explain why it
was impermissible for Congress to aggregate noncommercial
activities with commercially valuable activities as a single
class. 396
"In enacting the ESA Amendments in 1973, Congress had
a rational basis for believing that the statute would" protect
species that substantially affect interstate commerce because of

391. 310 U.S. 1 (1937).
392. See Dral & Phillips, supra note 5, at 10,413; Mank, supra note 5, at 73637.

393. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) ("Due respect for the
decisions of a coordinate branch of Government demands that we invalidate a
congressional enactment upon a plain showing that Congress has exceeded its
constitutional bounds."); Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 10, at 322; Mank, supra
note 5, at 792.
394. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2208 (2005) (quoting United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995».
395. Id. at 2208-13; id. at 2216-19 (Scalia, J., concurring); Adler, supra note
14, at 765-66; Barnett, supra note 22, at 747; Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 14,
at 494; Parry, supra note 163, at 859-60, 862; supra notes 310-312 and accompanying text.
396. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2208-13; id. at 2215-20 (Scalia, J., concurring); supra
note 311 and accompanying text.
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their direct and indirect economic value to biodiversity, complex ecosystems, and their "irreplaceable genetic heritage."397
In applying the rational basis standard to assess the statute's
constitutionality under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause, courts consider whether it is a comprehensive regulatory scheme in determining the amount of
scrutiny that will be applied to any single component of the
statute. In Hodel v. Indiana,398 the Court explained that a
comprehensive regulatory scheme can meet a rational basis
standard as long as the scheme as a whole is rational "without
a showing that every single facet of the program is independently and directly related to a valid congressional goal."399 Accordingly, the ESA's comprehensive scheme for protecting
threatened and endangered species is constitutional even if
some species by themselves lack sufficient economic value.
Similarly, the Lopez Court acknowledged that Congress
may regulate intrastate activities that lack substantial commercial value if they are "an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could
be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated."400
Both Raich and Justice Scalia's Raich concurrence eloquently
explain that the Court does not require each component of a
comprehensive statutory scheme to have independent economic
impacts on interstate commerce and that Congress may regulate non-economic, purely intrastate activities as long as they
are an appropriate part of a valid comprehensive scheme. The
burden is on a petitioner to demonstrate that Congress's definition of a class is inappropriate. 401
The Fourth Circuit in Gibbs concluded that Congress has
authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate any endangered or threatened species, no matter how few in number or
how insignificant in its impact on interstate commerce, because
the ESA is a comprehensive scheme for preserving endangered
species that satisfies the substantial effects standard for the

397. Mank, supra note 5, at 792-93.
398. 452 U.S. 314 (1981).
399. Id. at 329 n.17; Mank, supra note

5, at 767-68; Mank, supra note 9, at
947-48; Vermeule, supra note 75, at 11,335; supra note 75 and accompanying
text.
400. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561; Mank, supra note 5, at 768; Mank, supra note 9, at
950; Vermeule, supra note 75, at 11,335.
401. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2208-13; id. at 2215-20 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Clause. 402 The Gibbs court determined that applying the comprehensive scheme approach to the ESA was appropriate; otherwise, Congress would lack the power to protect the most endangered species simply because "there are too few animals left
to make a commercial difference."403 Accordingly, the Fourth
Circuit reasoned that a narrow interpretation of the Commerce
Clause that examined each endangered species separately
based on the number of animals at issue would "eviscerate the
comprehensive federal scheme for conserving endangered species and turn congressional judgment on its head."404
The Fifth Circuit in GDF concluded that the ESA's regulation of all endangered and threatened species was an essential
component of the ESA's broader regulatory scheme, and, therefore, that Congress had the authority under the Commerce
Clause to aggregate all such species in determining their impact on interstate commerce. 405 The GDF decision determined
that limiting the scope of the ESA to commercially valuable
threatened and endangered species would thwart Congress's
goal of protecting the "interdependent web" of whole ecosystems and the complex interrelationships among all species by
allowing "piecemeal extinctions."406 Additionally, the GDF decision found that "the link between species loss and a substantial commercial effect is not attenuated" because the statute is
limited to endangered species that would likely be affected by a
small number of "takes"-killings of individual animals-and
does not apply to abundant species. 407 Furthermore, the GDF
decision concluded that it was appropriate to aggregate all endangered species because the "ESA's protection of endangered
species is economic in nature."408 The court reached this deci-

402. Gibbs v. Babbit, 214 F.3d 483, 497-98 (4th Cir. 2000); Blumm & Kimbrell,
note 10, at 335-36; Mank, supra note 5, at 767-68; Mank, supra note 9, at
971; Santaniello, supra note 268, at 52.
403. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 498; BIumm & Kimbrell, supra note 10, at 335-36;
Mank, supra note 5, at 768; Santaniello, supra note 268, at 52.
404. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 498; BIumm & Kimbrell, supra note 10, at 335-36;
Mank, supra note 5, at 768.
405. GDF, 326 F.3d 622, 640 (5th Cir. 2003); BIumm & Kimbrell, supra note
10, at 340; Mank, supra note 9, at 989, 997-98; Santaniello, supra note 268, at
56-58.
406. GDF, 326 F.3d at 639-40; Mank, supra note 9, at 989-90, 997-98; Santaniello, supra note 268, at 58.
407. GDF, 326 F.3d at 640; Mank, supra note 9, at 989-90, 998; Santaniello,
supra note 268, at 56-58.
408. GDF, 326 F.3d at 639.
supra
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sion in light of the ESA's legislative history referring to the
'''incalculable value' of the genetic heritage that might be lost
absent regulation" and because "it is obvious that the majority
of takes would result from economic activity."409 Accordingly,
the GDF court concluded that regulating takes of a commercially insignificant Cave Species bat was an essential component of the ESA's broader regulatory scheme. 410
Both Raich and Justice Scalia's Raich concurrence suggest
that Congress may, under the Necessary and Proper Clause,
regulate commercially insignificant intrastate activities as part
of a comprehensive statutory scheme that appropriately regulates interstate commerce. 411 Under the Commerce Clause and
the Necessary and Proper Clause, courts should defer to the
ESA's comprehensive scheme. Courts should defer to Congress's rational assumption that protecting all threatened and
endangered species would more likely promote interstate commerce by protecting biodiversity and complex ecosystems. Additionally, courts should defer to congressional findings concerning the possible future economic benefits of preserving
these species. Accordingly, following Raich, courts should defer
to Congress's comprehensive policy for protecting all endangered and threatened species as a rational legislative policy,
even if Congress cannot prove that every single species would
have economic value in interstate commerce. 412

409. Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 93·412, at 4 (1973) ("The value of this genetic
heritage is, quite literally, incalculable."»; 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(I) (2000) (stating
that "various species of fish, wildlife, and plants in the United States have been
rendered extinct as a consequence of economic growth and development untempered by adequate concern and conservation"); Mank, supra note 9, at 989, 99697.
410. GDF, 326 F.3d at 639-40; Mank, supra note 9, at 997; Santaniello, supra
note 268, at 56-58.
411. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2208-13 (2005); id. at 2216-19 (Scalia,
J., concurring); supra notes 310-312 and accompanying text.
412. Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 10, at 360.
We think defenders of the take provision should emphasize to the Supreme Court the comprehensive scheme rationale which the Court so recently endorsed, stressing the biodiversity protection evident in the
ESA's ecosystem protection purpose, and the centrality of the take provision to achieving that purpose. The defenders of the ESA should also argue that without the ESA's comprehensive scheme, the states would engage in a destructive 'race to the bottom' that would damage biodiversity
and environmental quality.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Both Raich and Justice Scalia's Raich concurring opinion
allow Congress to regulate some intrastate activities that have
little economic value if the regulation is part of a comprehensive scheme that appropriately regulates activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. 413 They are right to conclude that Congress must be able to fashion comprehensive
statutes to regulate activities that can harm interstate commerce and that courts should not invalidate a regulatory
scheme even though it regulates some intrastate activities that
standing alone would not justify national regulation. 414 This is
consistent with the letter of Lopez and Morrison, which did not
address the issue of a comprehensive statutory scheme, and
would be undercut if Congress was not able to regulate some
intrastate activities that have little economic value. 415 Nevertheless, Raich and Justice Scalia's Raich concurring opinion
are more consistent with the spirit of Wickard, Darby, Hodel,
and Wrightwood Dairy than with the narrow economic focus of
Lopez and Morrison. 416
If it is rational for Congress to preempt state regulation of
medical marijuana because small amounts could be diverted to
interstate markets for recreational drug use, it is surely rational for Congress to enact the ESA to protect all threatened
and endangered species. There are strong scientific arguments
that protecting all threatened and endangered species pro-

413. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2215-20.
414. Id. at 2216-19.
415. Pushaw, supra note 35, at 884, 898-909 ("I think it is impossible to determine whether the majority or the dissent correctly applied the Lopez and Morrison standards, because they are so malleable as to justify either result.").
416. See Adler, supra note 14, at 751-54, 762-77 (arguing Raich effectively
overruled most of Lopez and Morrison where litigant challenges comprehensive
scheme statute as applied); Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 14, at 494-98 (same).
But see Pushaw, supra note 35, at 884.
I think it is impossible to determine whether the majority or the dissent
correctly applied the Lopez and Morrison standards, because they are so
malleable as to justify either result. Moreover, as the Justices implement
these standards prudentially on a case-by-case basis, it is unwise to extrapolate far-reaching implications from any single decision. Just as
many scholars prematurely heralded Lopez as the beginning of a Commerce Clause revolution, others now may be too quick to characterize
Raich as the end.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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motes biodiversity and protects complex ecosystems that we do
not fully understand, even if it is not possible to prove that
every single species is valuable. There is reasonable evidence
that promoting biodiversity and protecting complex ecosystems
would more likely promote interstate commerce. Many species
that do not have direct commercial value still have economic
value by serving as food for valuable species, pollinating valuable flowers, or decomposing waste so that ecosystems stay
healthy. Furthermore, there is a rational argument as well for
protecting all threatened and endangered species for their possible future economic benefits. Under an appropriately deferential rational basis standard, as applied in both Raich and
Justice Scalia's Raich concurring opinion, courts should defer
to congressional findings about the economic value of protecting all threatened and endangered species in a comprehensive
statutory scheme, even if it is not possible to prove that every
single species has economic value. 417
The ESA is consistent with the Constitution's federalist
principles. It only regulates threatened and endangered species, not all species. Once a species recovers sufficiently, the
federal government must return the species to state control.
The Court has held that states do not own the wildlife within
their borders, but share concurrent authority with the federal
government; consistent with the Court's decisions, the ESA
promotes concurrent federal-state regulation of species. Regulating threatened and endangered species is not a traditional
state function. Since 1900, the Lacey Act has given the federal
government a role in their protection; in 1894, Congress created Yellowstone National Park to protect endangered bison; in
1918, Congress regulated migratory birds and other federal
statutes have protected certain endangered species for decades. 418 Thus, the ESA comports with federalist principles and
is a necessary and a proper exercise of congressional authority
under the Commerce CIa use and the Necessary and Proper
Clause.
In cases involving a comprehensive statutory scheme, the
Raich decision signals that the Court will apply a deferential
rational basis approach in deciding whether Congress may
regulate non-economic, intrastate activities if such regulation

417.
418.

See supra notes 310-312 and accoinpanying text.
See supra Part V.B.

2007]

AFTER RAICH: IS THE ESA CONSTITUTIONAL?

461

is necessary to effectuate regulation of interstate commerce. 419
Mter Raich, there is a much stronger probability that the
Court will uphold the constitutionality of the ESA under the
Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause. 420 Professor Blumm and George Kimbrell argue that the Court's denial of certiorari in GDF was directly related to the Court's
Raich decision. They write:
The Raich decision's aftershock effect on the ESA was apparently obvious to the Court: The Monday following the filing of the Raich decision, after holding the GDF Realty certiorari petition for more than a year (presumably while
waiting for the Raich opinion), the Court denied certiorari
in GDF Realty without comment.421
The appointment of Chief Justice Roberts to replace Chief Justice Rehnquist and the appointment of Justice Alito to replace
Justice O'Connor will not diminish the Raich majority because
both departing justices were on the dissenting side. 422

419. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2210 (2005); Adler, supra note 14, at
751-54, 762-77 (arguing Raich effectively overruled most of Lopez and Morrison
where litigant challenges law as applied); Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 14, at
494-98 (discussing Raich's use of comprehensive scheme principle and arguing
Raich increases probability Supreme Court will find Endangered Species Act constitutional); Reynolds & Denning, supra note 163, at 932-34.
Barring a major, and unlikely, shift of the Court's composition, we now
doubt that a robust judicially·enforceable federalism has much future
left. We are unlikely to see a lower federal court, after Raich, strike
down an act of Congress on Commerce Clause grounds, or even take the
more modest step of upholding an as-applied challenge to a federal law.
[d.; supra note 180 and accompanying text.
420. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
421. Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 14, at 494; accord ROBERT PERCIVAL ET
AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAw, SCIENCE & POLICY 898 (5th ed., 2006).
One week after it decided Gonzales v. Raich, the Supreme Court denied
review in the GDF Realty case, which it had held pending its decision
concerning federal authority to prohibit cultivation and use of medical
marijuana. This may indicate that the Court believes that there is no
constitutional problem with applying the Endangered Species Act to species who are so endangered that their destruction would not itself substantially affect interstate commerce because, like intrastate use of marijuana, regulation is necessary to effectuate a broader regulatory scheme.
[d.
422. Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 14, at 497-98 (arguing Chief Justice Roberts is likely to follow Raich precedent and that Supreme Court will find Endangered Species Act constitutional even if he does not vote in favor of the ESA).
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While the comprehensive scheme rationale in the Raich
majority opinion provides a strong rationale for sustaining the
constitutionality of the comprehensive ESA, whether Justice
Scalia's concurrence would also sustain the constitutionality of
the statute raises interesting intellectual questions, although it
is of less practical significance. Because he is often unsympathetic to environmental issues, it remains to be seen how Justice Scalia would personally assess the constitutionality of the
ESA. In Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a
Great Oregon (Sweet Home), the Court upheld the Secretary of
Interior's broad interpretation of its regulatory authority over
private landowners.423 Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, wrote a dissenting opinion in
which he argued that the words "take" and "harm" as used in
the ESA could not possibly mean "habitat modification"; therefore, he argued that the Secretary could not regulate private
landowners whose activities harm the critical habitat of
threatened and endangered species. 424 Many environmentalists perceive Justice Scalia as hostile to environmental issues. 425 Nevertheless, Justice Scalia in City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund sided with an environmentalist
organization because the plain language of the statute was
consistent with his textualist approach to statutory interpretation. 426 Thus, even if Justice Scalia personally disfavors the
423.

515 u.S. 687, 707 (1995).

424. Id. at 714-36 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Bradford C. Mank, Is a Textualist
Approach to Statutory Interpretation Pro-Environmentalist?: Why Pragmatic
Agency Decisionmaking Is Better Than Judicial Literalism, 53 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1231, 1265-66 (1996) (discussing Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Sweet
Home).
425. See, e.g., David R. Rodas, Standing and Climate Change: Can Anyone
Complain About the Weather?, 15 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 451, 456-57 (2000)
(criticizing Justice Scalia's narrow interpretation of standing for environmental
plaintiffs); Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What's Environmental About Environmental Law in the Supreme Court, 47 UCLA L. REV. 703, 727-29, 739, 764 (2000)
(ranking Justice Scalia as the most anti-environmentalist in modern history from
October Term 1969 until October Term 1998); Robert V. Percival, "Greening" the
Constitution-Harmonizing Environmental and Constitutional Values, 32 ENVTL.
L. 809, 827, 847 (2002) (criticizing Justice Scalia's approach to standing issues in
environmental cases).
426. 511 U.S. 328, 339 (1994); Richard J. Lazarus & Claudia M. Newman, City
of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund: Searching for Plain Meaning in Unambiguous Ambiguity, 4 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 23 & passim (1995) (discussing
Justice Scalia's opinion in City of Chicago) (professor Lazarus argued the City of
Chicago case before the Supreme Court on behalf of the Environmental Defense
Fund and Newman worked with him on the case); Mank, supra note 424, at 1232-
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ESA, he may rule in favor of its constitutionality in light of his
Raich concurrence. 427
For all the above reasons, the ESA is constitutional under
the Commerce Clause. Under Raich's comprehensive scheme
approach to the Commerce Clause, rational congressional findings about the ecological, biodiversity, medical, recreational,
genetic, and other benefits of the statute are sufficient to justify the regulation of all threatened and endangered species,
even if some have mainly intrastate impacts. To preserve
these myriad benefits, Congress, under the Necessary and
Proper Clause, may regulate all threatened and endangered
species because apparently insignificant species can affect
other species and ecosystems that have clear economic value.
Further, the statute is not inconsistent with the federalism
concerns of Lopez and Morrison because protection of endangered species is a concurrent area of federal and state regulation, there is a legitimate congressional concern in preventing a
race to the bottom among states in preserving these species,
and the ESA contains a limiting principle as recovered species
return to state control.

33, 1257-62, 1290-92 (discussing Justice Scalia's opinion in City of Chicago).
427. See Adler, supra note 14, at 766-68 (discussing and criticizing Justice
Scalia's Raich concurrence for too broadly expanding federal power); Claeys, supra note 19, at 815 ("Nevertheless, Raich makes clear that Scalia will side with
the nationalists in the unlikely event that the Court entertains Commerce Clause
challenges to other federal schemes that regulate local activities on the pretense
of guaranteeing certain consequences for interstate trade.").
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